After a telegram from Sazanov ((Russian Foreign Minister)) about
Enver Paşa, von Giers sent five urgent cipher
messages:
7 August:
“General
Leontiev has learned from a secret source that on the night of
26-27 ((July)) the
Turkish Army began to mass in northern and western
Thrace. This was done at the behest of Austria and
Germany and it was
aimed to force Bulgaria into an agreement with Austria. There are some
signs that Bulgaria has given
in to this pressure. Even though there
are
certainly some sacrifices we can offer in exchange* to compensate for
this eventuality, it is my opinion that we must incite Romania to oppose
this development.”
*very meaningful.
7 August:
“I spoke with
the Prime Minister ((Said Halim Paşa)) today and told
him in absolute confidentiality that the
Turkish Army’s mobilization is
aimed against Russia. I added that the same assurance he had given
me that Turkey’s 9th and 11th Armies were pulling back
from our border
had been given to General Leontiev by Enver Paşa. I asked the Prime
Minister whether or not he
was aware of the Leontiev-Enver conversation.
In response, he told me that Enver Paşa had said nothing to him about it
but that this Minister is an honest and honorable man and that like he
himself,
Enver Paşa was ready to please us vis-à-vis this mobilization
matter and would make this evident by every action taken.
He hoped
that all of his Ministers shared this view of his.
Although
General Leontiev has insistently reiterated that my personal
conversations with
the Prime Minister are more important than his, the
fact that Enver Paşa did
not relate his conversation with Leontiev to
the Prime Minister served to prove
his personal sincerity even more.
He ((Enver)) is the firmest proponent of Turkey
entering the war in
the cabinet. My
conversation with the Prime Minister happened before
the receipt of our
telegram but I agree with you and I will send Leontiev
to Enver Paşa once
again.”
It is quite a sad
and strange thing that a Minister of War would propose
an accord to a foreign
envoy without the knowledge of the Prime Minister
and the other Ministers, and
for that Prime Minister, who was also the
Foreign Minister, to learn about this
proposal from the same foreign
envoy. In
any event, having registered my opinion about the oddity of
this proposal,
valid or not, being made through improper channels, let us
continue with the
translation.
The German warships "Göben" and "Breslau" did, in fact,
reach Istanbul on 11 August and changed the situation
dramatically. Enver's offer to the Russians evaporated and
the warships bombarded Russian Black Sea ports on 29
October 1914 as the "Yavuz" and "Midilli" warships of
the Ottoman Navy, starting WWI between Turkey and
Russia.
8 August:
“The Prime
Minister told me today in no uncertain terms that:
The
passage of the Goeben and Breslau warships through the Straits
will never be
allowed; our
consulates may begin to again use (here a
word has been forgotten) for telegrams; and absolute
neutrality will be
continued.
He wanted me to transmit these matters to you
by telegram. However,
the Turks are very
touchy, the soldiers are very dominant and the Prime
Minister lacks
influence. Consequently, it is my
opinion that the situation
is extremely serious.”
9 August:
“In
accordance with your telegrams, General Leontiev went to see Enver
Paşa
again. The Minister of War told him that
his viewpoint had not
changed in regard to him being in favor of an agreement
with Russia.
Although he did not hide
the fact that this could put him at odds with the
rest of the government, he
stated that he hoped that he could successfully
manage this opposition since it
comes mostly from the Army.
The
Bulgarians have also put forth their proposals in recent days, but
when push
comes to shove Ottoman national interests will prevail. The
Minister of War explained his point of
view clearly and succinctly. In
order to assure Russia of its good intentions,
Turkey will pull back all of
its forces on the Caucasus border and most of these
forces will be sent
to the western border.
In addition, as soon as possible they will assemble
a large army in
Thrace and put this at our disposal. He
is ready to have
this army sent against any Balkan government, including
Bulgaria, or
together with us against Austria.
He promised that the day this
agreement becomes a fait accompli, all the
German officers will be
removed from the Turkish Army. For such a result to occur, Enver Paşa
listed
the following conditions:
--the Aegean
Islands and Western Thrace must be returned to Turkey and
there must be a five
or ten-year defense agreement between Turkey and
Russia in order to ensure that Turkey does not
suffer retribution from its
Balkan neighbors.
During the entire conversation, Enver Paşa spoke calmly and in a
friendly
manner. He gave General
Leontiev a very clear picture of the situation
from the perspective of Turkish
national interests. In response to a
question from Leontiev, Enver Paşa said that he knew well that Turkey
would
become the object of German enmity but that, in his own opinion,
this would not
scare the Turks because Turkey and Germany do not share
a border, so even if
Germany were to be victorious it would be difficult to
harm Turkey. He added that war had taught him how to
defend against
a naval expedition, as well.
In the event that this decision can be taken
immediately, General
Leontiev is certain that this matter would be
resolved successfully. Since he has been made supreme commander, all
Turkish forces are in Enver’s hands. As there is no time to put this
message
into cipher, General Leontiev requests that a copy of
this telegram be sent to
the ((Russian))
Ministry of War.”
This last sentence
shows well the hellish and feverish activities at the
Russian embassy and all
the other foreign missions in those days!
9 August: “Since
time is of the essence, it is my opinion that we must
accept Enver Paşa’s
proposal immediately without discussing it with
anyone else. If we are victorious, we will always have the
opportunity
to make conscessions to Greece and Bulgaria. However, if we refuse
the proposal then we
will surely have no chance with Turkey and drive
the Turks into the arms of our
enemies. In the event that Enver is not
completely sincere, then this will serve to cement our position that the
situation has reached the point where an unavoidable crisis will result
in a
cut-off of relations.”
In response to
this quite prudent message from von Giers, Sazonov,
whom Monsieiur Poincare
characterized as a clumsy diplomat in his
memoir, sent this telegram on 12 August:
“I have not
yet received a reply from Sofia. Don’t
forget that we must
gain time in our negotiations with Enver Paşa, and keep in
mind that
whatever Turkey might do directly against us will not scare us. Maintain
a friendly manner in our
conversations with the Turks but impress upon
them that if they engage in
certain activities that do not comport with
our wishes, then they will be faced with the danger
of losing all of
Anatolia. Remind them that
although they do not have the power to do
us any real harm, together with our
English and French allies we hold
the fate of Anatolia in our hands.”
The second
telegram concerns the Turks promising neutrality but also
certain ideas and
assurances about the Turks abandoning provocative
actions in Azerbaijan. The same day von Giers sent this meaningful
telegram to the Foreign Minister:
“On account
of the seriousness of the situation and the danger that an
agreement between
Turkey and Germany will mean for us, although I
had told you about the Prime
Minister’s feeling that an agreement with
us was possible, I must reiterate
that his influence is quite weak and it
is possible that at any moment he may
be ousted and Enver Paşa may
become a dictator. Under these conditions, the
only way that Turkey
will not enter the war as our enemy is if we more or less
agree to Enver’s
proposal. We have very
little time and it is my firm opinion that we must
make a decision
immediately.”
The same day
Sazonov informed his ambassadors in Paris and London
about Enver’s proposals:
“I am sending
this telegram for clarity’s sake with regard to Enver Paşa’s
proposals of a few
days ago:
The Turks
will pull back their forces from the Caucasus border; they will
give us an army in Thrace to act against any Balkan state and against the
Bulgarians if they oppose us; and the German
missions in Turkey will be
removed;
In return, Turkey
will get the territory in Thrace up to the 22nd line-south
((sic, not further explained)) and
Mediterranean islands. In addition, a
defense agreement will be made between Turkey and Bulgaria.”
Subsequently, von
Giers sent these telegrams to the Minister:
18 August: “This
morning the Prime Minister was more tense.
As I
entered his office, Enver and a military party were exiting and it
was
evident that the Prime Minister was discomfited by Enver’s visit.
Returning to the matter of concessions, the Prime
Minister said that
they did not want a significant amount of territory but
since the land
in question is by right Turkey’s, acquiring it could not be
considered
a victory for them. This was
contrary to what he had said three days
before.
He talked about the islands and the portion of Western Thrace
where
Moslems live. As for the overall
situation, matters are getting
increasingly serious. In particular, the day may come when power
slips from Enver’s hands. In any case,
Enver is under the influence
of extremist soldiers who are being incited and
aroused by the Germans.”
18 August:
“We received no other instructions today.
The English
ambassador returned here from leave. Based on the impressions I got
from my
discussion with the Prime Minister today, and in order not to
lose time, the
French ambassador, who has also not received instructions
on this matter, and I
decided to make a joint appeal to Bab-ı âli.
One
after another, we went to see the Prime Minister and told him that if
Turkey remains neutral then Turkey’s territorial integrity would we
assured and
that we would protect Turkey from any attack.
I added that
it was necessary for Bab-ı âli to give us an assurance regarding its
desire
to remain neutral. The issue of
demobilization was not discussed
because, at present, the Prime Minister is in
no position to do anything
about that.
Since the military would never agree to any such request, it
would only
further inflame the crisis. Our visits
had a good effect on
the Prime Minister and it was possible for us to provide
him with some
support. Nevertheless, I
continue to believe that there is some hope of
eliminating the danger only if
we accept in principle the extension of
territory issue and promise that we
will help in this regard.”
Russia's desire for Istanbul and the Straits can be seen
from this map that accompanied the Triple Entente
powers "Constantinople Agreement" of March-April
1915. The area in yellow was envisioned as going to
Russia.
//END//
