The first airplane fleet to arrive in Tripoli came on 15
October (1911)
and included six aircraft, five certified pilots and eight officers,
three
of whom were students. Each pilot
had a particular type of plane,
as follows:
Capt. Piazza – in a single-wing Bleriot airplane;
Capt. Moizo and Navy First Lieutenant Ross - in a
Nieuport-type
airplane;
First Lieutenant Gavotti - in a double-wing Dietrich-type airplane;
First Lieutenant Rada – in a double-wing Farman-type airplane.
Twelve machinist soldiers from the science-specialist team
were
assigned to the Tripoli air headquarters.
There was a landing area
for the airplanes at the upper end of the
Jewish cemetery at Bab-el-
Gedid and large tents were set up as hangers to
protect the airplanes
from inclement weather.
More airplanes were sent to Libya. In November, there were 5 at
Benghazi, 5 at
Derne and 5 at Tobruk. This was the final
effort made
at that time by military officials, in the name of aviation, and
there
were no more certified airplane officers remaining in Italy. So, out
of patriotism, Italian civil aviation
offered to help the military and an
airplane detachment made up of two small
fleets under the command
of reserve Capt. Montu, was sent to Derne and Tobruk. Concurrently,
Col. Morris, the chief of the
aviation office, was searching for new
sources of equipment and personnel. In January 1912, a total of 32
additional
airplanes were sent to Libya:
7 to Benghazi;
1 to Homs;
6 to Derne;
18 to Tripoli.
In July (1912), a new fleet of five or six airplanes was sent to
Buchemess.
After all these arrangements were made, airplanes began to
be used for
both reconnaissance and for warfare. Airplanes’ ability to locate the
enemy gained
appreciation. So whereas informers would
have to run to
the HQS and be late with their news, in no time at all airplanes
could
identify enemy concentrations close to the forward outposts and provide
that information.
In addition, there was a desire to have the airplanes drop
bombs on the
enemy HQS. However, at the
speed they were going, the airplanes
would have to ascend to a particular
altitude to avoid the Arabs’ rifle
firing, making any kind of precision-bombing
impossible. Also, at
the time the bombs
were still small and imperfect and rarely had a
significant effect on the
spread-out enemy positions. In summary,
with regard to the subject of airplane bombing,
the results were
completely negative.
It must be said, as well, that airplanes have been used to
establish
contact with the desert Arabs, in terms of dropping leaflets to them
about the secret aims of the Turks, who
pretend to be the Arabs’
friends.
Airplanes are, at times, vulnerable to enemy artillery fire
and, more
frequently, rifle fire. Early
on, since the airplanes flew no more than
600 meters above the enemy , most of
them were hit by rifle bullets.
Fortunately, none of the bullets hit the vital elements of the
airplanes.
Nevertheless, based on this
situation, the pilots have determined that
they must ascend to 1,000-1,200
meters in altitude in order to avoid
rifle fire.
//END of PART TWO//
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