19 Temmuz 2018 Perşembe

Cat Survives 80-Kilometer Minibus Ride in Motor

türkçe links to original Turkish article

(Milliyet Newspaper, 18 July 2018)

Minibüsün motorunda 80 kilometre giden kedinin sahibi: Yaşaması mucize
Not the best way to travel - sort of sub-economy.  Free water,
though, if you survive.

Last Saturday, a minibus with 15 passengers left Milas en route to
Bodrum, 80 kilometers away.  While on the road the sound of a cat
could be heard inside the minibus.  Nevertheless, although the driver
stopped the vehicle three times, the source of the sound could not be

As the passengers alighted at the Bodrum bus terminal, a grey cat
emerged from the motor compartment of the minibus.  After giving
the cat water and soothing it, the driver and passengers alerted Füsün
Uslu, the head of the Bodrum Animal Rights Association. Uslu and
animal-lover Gülşah Ürgüplü came to the bus  terminal and took the
"Iran kedisi" (Iran-breed cat) to the Bodrum Municipality's Temporary
Animal Care Center.

mesut göktaş füsun uslu gülşah ürgüplü ile ilgili görsel sonucu
                             Feline wanderlust 

The cat's owner, Mesut Göktaş (65),  saw news reports the next day
and was overjoyed to get his cat, whose name is 'Boncuk', back, noting
that "Boncuk was white but now grey from staying so long in the motor
compartment.  There's no injury though. It's a miracle."

milas bodrum haritası ile ilgili görsel sonucu

18 Temmuz 2018 Çarşamba

Bus (Mole)-Station in Judicial Vacuum

türkçe links to original Turkish article

(Vatan Newspaper, 17 July 2018)

[Haber görseli]
All this trouble, just for trying to be helpful...

bus assistant click here for previous TNT reporting of this ilk.

brazilian model click her for TNT coverage of another bus

Teenager E.A. left Çorlu in February for her semester break, boarding
a bus with her mother and grandmother to visit relatives in Iğdır. On
the return trip, however, E.A. was molested by bus assistant Cihat T.
near Amasya and he was arrested and jailed.

E.A. explained that "my mother and I were sitting together on the
bus but my mother went to sit by my grandfather to keep him
company.  After I watched some TV I fell asleep.  When I awoke
bus assistant Cihat T. had his hands on my breasts (!).  As his
hands were headed toward my private parts I awoke completely.
He sat down next to me so I changed my seat but he sat next to
me again and asked 'did you like it?'  When I said 'no!' he kissed
my cheeks and the side of my lips.  Arriving home my aunt asked
me why I was so quiet so I told her about my experience."

As for Cihat T., he said that E.A. misunderstood his intentions (!):
"When we came to Amasya E.A.'s shirt was open from her waist
to her breasts so I straightened out her shirt and covered her,
tucking in her shirt to her tights.  She apparently misunderstood
my actions." (!)

After an indictment was prepared by the Çorlu Public Prosecutor
the court ruled that since the incident occurred in Amasya it
should be tried there.  However, the court in Amasya objected
to this.  In consequence, E.A.'s lawyer Bihter Mekereci lamented
that "in these days when sexual harassment incidents are on the
rise they can't even get this case started.  The Yargıtay (senior
court) has to figure out this jurisdiction issue." 

çorlu amasya ığdır haritası ile ilgili görsel sonucu
Çorlu is near Istanbul on the left of the blue line. Iğdır
all the way on the right, with Amasya about in the middle.

TNT History Mini-Series: Greek Commander in Turkish War Rebukes Rival (1922)/Part X - Final

//Ed. Note: In his conclusion, Gen. Papoulas minces no words
in castigating Gen. Stratigos for his alleged misrepresentations
and slanders, with regard to the Battle of Sakarya (August, 
1921), in particular.//

general anastasios papoulas ile ilgili görsel sonucu
          General Anastasios Papoulas

                                                         Addendum (A)

          In an article published in “Politika” newspaper, “Mr. Stratigos” claims that
General Papoulas has confused events with the event dates and occurrences, and 
that,  at the same time, some of the former Chief Commander’s telegrams reflect 
his own  ill intentions.

          “General Papoulas” answers these accusations with the following letter:

          “General Stratigos” is trying to convince me in quite a naive way about my 
mixing up issues and my not remembering events.  But it would have been preferable
 for him to show us which of these telegrams he is talking about; in this way we 
would have found out that we were being deceived. “Mr. Stratigos” wanted to 
convince us with mere words.  The aforementioned individual is asking us  whether 
or not we proposed the “Sakarya” expedition, just as others, by examining the 
army’s report, have wanted to convince us  in regard to our having recommended 
the “Sakarya” expedition.

          However, if the people who rely on this report had carefully examined and 
researched the matters I presented to the public in my first article, they would have
 noticed the following points that do not supprt their case:

          “This report was written upon the specific order given to me by the Minister 
of War for advancing to Ankara, and, accordingly, it was predicated on the basis of 
the necessity for us to initiate this expedition.  Certainly,for this reason in the first 
portion of the report, based on a question the army was subjected to on this issue, 
the statement is made to the effect that we must pursue the enemy, etcetera.  In this 
way, it shows that the operation was mandatory not according to the army’s own 
ideas and opinions, but because the operation had to be undertaken in accordance 
with the order given to the army to conduct the expedition.
           However, further on in the report the army points out the difficulties 
confronting the success of the initiative and that if, in the course of the operation,
these difficulties manifest themselves, then the army would make a decision as 
the result of having to return to the departure lines (lines of initial movement). 

          As we have said previously, though, the report was not considered and the 
expedition happened.

           As I conclude my letter, without holding responsible those agents who have
insulted me personally with their attacks, I assert that I will continue every 
argument based on documents and official records.  Let me add that I challenge 
anyone who wants to confront me on this issue.

                                                      Addendum (B)
          In response to Mr. Papoulas’s accusations that Mr. Stratigos was actually the 
author of the orders that the Minister of War wrote from Bursa, telling the army to 
stay on the east bank of the Sakarya and fortify its positions, Mr. Stratigos claims 
that he was not in “Bursa” on 4 September 1921.  Additionally, the aforementioned
individual is sending the following copy of a letter, which was sent to himself by 
the Prime Minister via radio telegram, and which, rather than showing that at that 
time there was a rift between General Dosmanis and “Mr. Theotokis”, on the 
contrary, exposes that the aforementioned individual suggested to the Prime 
Minister the ideas and plans that “Mr. Papoulas” has attributed to “Mr. Stratigos”:

                                                                                                                      1 – 9 – 21

                         To the Prime Minister at the Ministry of War in Athens

          Number                                                                             De-ciphered telegram   

          As I send the following report of the Chief of the General Staff, I am also 
transmitting the ideas and judgments of the competent authorities, whose opinions
I personally share.  The government may provide to the army the instructions 
contained in the following report, without violating the policy the government has
thus far followed of not interfering in matters which are strictly military.

           Mr. Prime Minister,
          I see that the army, in the latest phase of the evolution of its thinking and
decisions, personally intends to continue its retreat to “Eskişehir”.  Without 
hesitation, I submit my opinion that the army’s retreat march from the definite
line on the east side of the Sakarya has put the government and the army in a very 
difficult position and I request that at this time, at least, I be listened to and obeyed.
It is an essential and immediate requirement that this retreat movement toward the
rear be stopped until a buffer zone is established to separate the warring armies, in
the course of any political initiatives to be undertaken in the future.    

          Again, without hesitation, I submit by belief that our army staying near the 
west bank of the Sakarya  will not eliminate the consequences resulting from the 
stoppage of our forward movement toward the northeast, but it will modify these 

          I request that you stop the full army’s movement toward “Eskişehir” in order
to assure and support the morale of half the army and to enable the government to
engage in political negotiations. 

          The only reason I am involving myself in the discussion about this matter is
 that our military position, and our invasive and aggressive posture, have an effect
 on public opinion.  For this reason I take this initiative, which inspires in me a pure
 and clean feeling of patriotism.  

          In the event that you approve my ideas on this subject and have the army 
accept it as the decision of the government, I will provide detailed information and
 explanations about the matter and the situation as I deem appropriate.

          Dosmanis, Theotokis                                             Secret registry number 15061
                                                                                              Transmitted on 2 – 9 – 21

 theotokis minister of war ile ilgili görsel sonucu
Georgios Theotokis, Greek Minister of War

          In response to this, “General Papoulas” declares that order number 15802, 
not telegram number 15790, is attributable to Mr. Stratigos and that Mr. Stratigos 
did  not just write the aforementioned order, he even brought it himself to 

          As evidence of this “Mr. Papoulas mentions Ministry of War telegram number
 15842 of 8 – 9 -21, in which there is the following sentence:

          “I think that you received order number 15802, which was sent to you via 
“General Stratigos” so that you would receive it more quickly...”

          In addition to this, General “Dosmanis” talks about the army being left at a 
position not far from the west bank of the Sakarya.

          The aforementioned individual does not mention extending and lengthening the
 front to the Black Sea and Antalya, nor does he talk about the promotion of certain
classes after the implementation of the lengthening issue. 

          The other possibility is that Mr. Dosmanis fell victim to the ideas of 
Mr. Stratigos, who at that time was telling everyone about his projects related to 
lengthening our lines.

          When it comes to General Statigos’s claim that he mentioned in “Politika” 
newspaper on 4 October, about the existence of a telegram whose publication would
rattle General Papoulas, “Mr. Papoulas” submits that such a telegram could never
be published since it exists only in the imagination of Mr. Stratigos.

general xenophon stratigos ile ilgili görsel sonucu

General Xenophon Stratigos 


TNT History Mini-Series: Greek Commander in Turkish War Rebukes Rival (1922)/Part IX

//Ed. Note: As the Second Battle of İnönü draws to a close,
Gen. Papoulas desperately requests reinforcements, while
at the same time praising the competence and organization of
the opposing Turks.  In the end, Gen. Papoulas pins the blame
for this "disastrous operation" squarely on the shoulders of 
Gen. Stratigos.//

battle of inönü ile ilgili görsel sonucu

At the same time, General Vlachopoulos informed me that the 10th Division’s retreat 
had left the 3rd and 7th Divisions, on either side the 10th Division, exposed.  He 
therefore wanted to order the other divisions to withdraw to the same area.  In 
response, I told General Vlachopoulos that this proposal (daytime retreat proposal) 
could not be accepted.  In order to avoid the anticipated dangers, I ordered that all 
divisions be withdrawn at night.  This retreat order was implemented in an orderly 
way; however, since the 3rd Division did not receive this order in time, it was 
subjected to an enemy attack in the morning and, forced to retreat under enemy 
pressure, this situation naturally caused some disruptions in the division.

                                        Arrival of the Reinforcement Detachments

          The same day, the long-awaited extra regiment arrived at Mudanya, but much 
later than had been expected. Moreover, the aforementioned regiment had been sent
 with many shortfalls.   Immediately, this regiment was ordered to move to reinforce
 our retreating forces and to support the retreat. 

         But the regiment was only able to leave from Bursa on 30 March.  All of our 
units were retreating and they encountered each other a few kilometers from the 
departure lines (first movement lines), where the retreating units were waiting.

          Late at night the army sent the following telegram to the government:

          Command of the Army of Asia Minor
          General Staff Office 1                                                                     19- 3 -21
                                              To the Ministry of War in Athens
                                               To the Army General Staff Office
          Extremely Urgent
          Because the extra force Y4T3 cadre was only one-third complete, I request 
that all reserve recruit soldiers belonging to this detachment be sent so that the 
entirety of the aforementioned detachment be completed and its homogeneity assured. 

          Commander of the Army of Asia Minor
          Papoulas                                                   Will be transmitted to the First Office

          At the same time, the army gave the order to the First Corps, which had 
occupied Afyonkarahisar, to retreat to the departure positions.   The First Corps 
implemented this movement very skillfully.  The aforementioned Corps repelled 
the enemy’s very severe counterattack at Dumlupınar.  During this attack, Second
Division Commander “Valetas” and Corps Commander “Kontoulis” distinguished
themselves.  In his articles, “Stratigos” used the phrase “brave but old officers”, 
when referring to the aforementioned individuals.  Actually, it is true that General
Kontoulis is as old as I am.  But he achieved his rank on the field of battle.   

general kontoulis ile ilgili görsel sonucu
General Alexandros Kontoulis

          After our retreat, which emboldened the enemy and suggested to it the idea 
of launching an attack against us, in order to reinforce the front, and even more 
importantly, to raise the morale of the detachments, the army did not hesitate to 
ask for reinforcements, as the following telegrams prove.

          Command of the Army of Asia Minor    
          General Staff Office 1                                                                        20 – 3 – 21
          Number                                                                                                  Secret

                                               To the Ministry of War in Athens     
                                                    To the General Staff Office

          As a supplement to my report number 4414 of 19 – 3 – 21, in order to 
complete the complement of the army extra regiments, I request that all reserves 
belonging to extra  Y43-5, Y33-1 be sent to Izmir and the reserve soldiers belonging
 to Y40-3 and Y39-2 be sent to Mudanya.

          Commander of the Army of Asia Minor
          Will be sent to Army Central Command Echelon/General Staff First and 
Fourth Offices.

          Command of the Army of Asia Minor
          General Staff Office 1
          Registry number: 4510                                                                      23 – 3 – 21
                                                                                                                     Top priority

          Of the reinforcement detachments whose movements have been reported since 
the 17th of the current month, so far only 1,454 soldiers have been sent via the ships 
“Argos” and “Tinus”.

          I request that the gravity of the situation be considered and that the concerned 
officials show more interest and attention to the matter.

          Until further notice, I request that all reinforcements be sent to Izmir.
          Army Commander

          As is seen by these telegrams, the army had begun to rebel against the 
Ministry’s  indifference, which had taken on a dangerous form vis-a-vis the army.
At the same time, the army, concerned about the gravity of the situation, sent the
 following report to the government:

          Command of the Army of Asia Minor
          General Staff Office 1                                                                              Bursa
          Secret registry number 139-4531                                                       25 – 3 – 21

                                                To the Ministry of War in Athens
                                                      To the General Staff Office
                                                                                                                     Top Priority

          Response to order number 2023:

          The experience obtained from the recent operation has given me the opinion 
that  within the past two months the enemy has progressed more than it had in the 
previous two years.

          The enemy army, whatever its amount, has organized well with many officers; 
these officers have established obedience in the enemy army and because of the recent
conference (London Conference) and French-Italian backing, their morale and hopes
have increased.

          There is a 25,000-man force made up mostly of infantry on the Bursa front and
a 15,000-man force on the Uşak front.  According to intelligence, within fifteen days
they will be reinforced with regular army soldiers from the Sivas Army Corps and 
perhaps other detachments that will be brought by sea from Cilicia and the Caucasus.
Consequently, we must initiate an attack within 15 days, before the enemy can 
strengthen significantly.

          However, in order to launch an attack with a strong possibility of success, at 
the first opportunity the army must be reinforced with approximately 52,000 soldiers,
in accordance with the contents of reports number 4062 of 8 – 3 -21 and 4107 of 
11 – 3 – 21; of our complement, more than 290 officers and 4,000 soldiers are away 
from the line of battle. Also, in order to reorganize the 3rd Army Corps, two 
complete  divisions, or at least one, must be sent.

          With regard to matters of supply, in the current situation I request that the 
shipment of fortification, telegraph and health equipment be sent immediately, not to 
mention the equipment and animals and transport automobiles we have been 
requesting  for three months but which has still not yet been sent.

          I will send a detailed report about requirements soon.  But above all, we 
require the transport of the reinforcement detachments and equipment that was 
requested, of which only a small portion has been sent so far.  It suffices to remind
you that up to now only a 2,000-man reinforcement contingent has been sent. 
           Each passing week serves to allow the enemy to increase its forces and 
provisions.  For this reason the army’s reinforcement is mandatory.  The government
must give this matter attention, gauge the country’s forces and make its decision 

battle of inönü ile ilgili görsel sonucu

          Up to now we have left matters up to official documents.

          Now, let there be a judgment as to who bears responsibility for this disastrous 
operation and, if possible, let us condemn him.

           If we had truly been the culprits behind this failure, then the government of
 that period would not have spared us. But perhaps at the same time we protected
 the command so that the responsibility would not be forgotten. 

          When it comes to Mr. Stratigos, who was the military advisor to all the 
governments of that period, we will always ask him why he did not discover and 
anticipate events ahead of time and why he did not prevent the defeat by using his 
influence to hasten the transport of reinforcements.


TNT History Mini-Series: Greek Commander in Turkish War Rebukes Rival (1922)/Part VIII

//Ed. Note: In the lead-up to the Second Battle of İnönü, 
Gen. Papoulas realized that without reinforcements the Greek 
Army could not achieve victory. In this part of his story, 
Gen.  Papoulas presents telegrams that show him pleading
with his superiors for reinforcements.

Ultimately, Gen. Papoulas had the Greek Army retreat
on 19 March 1921 (According to modern calendars, the
battle was fought between 23 March and 1 April 1921.)//

second battle of inönü ile ilgili görsel sonucu

Apart from these, the army, which was of the opinion that the fate and destiny of the 
operation was dependent on the arrival of the reinforcement detachments, as was 
proven subsequently, requested by telegram that the extra regiment, which although
promised had still not arrived, be sent. 

          The telegram in question was written this way:

          Command of the Army of Asia Minor                                                   Bursa
          General Staff Office 1                                                                         8 – 3 – 21
          Number                                                                                                   Cipher
          2390                                                                                                    Most Urgent

                                                To the Ministry of War in Athens

          As I stated previously, in addition to the reinforcement soldiers comprised of 3 
mobilized classes that will be sent to us, it is essential that the extra regiment and the 
independent reinforcement detachments in the country be ordered to depart 
immediately  upon reciept of this telegram.  They should be disembarked at 
Mudanya.  I request that  the response be provided by telegram.

 This will also be transmitted to the Ministry of War’s Central General Staff Office.
                                                                                                          Army Commander

 The army sent the telegram below the next day, as a continuation of the above 

          Command of the Army of Asia Minor                                                 Bursa
          General Staff Office 1                                                                       9 – 3 – 21
                                                     To the Ministry of War in Athens

          To be transmitted at top priority.

          I request that you communicate how the soliders who will be sent as 
reinforcements are equipped with regard to garments, gear and weapons, and the
 type of armaments they will be carrying.

                                                                                                          Army Commander

 second battle of inönü ile ilgili görsel sonucu

          On 10 March, the First Army Corps, in accordance with the army’s attack 
order of 3 March, attacked the enemy at attack target Afyonkarahisar and captured it.  
Meanwhile, the Third Army Corps, after a long and fierce battle in front of İnegöl, 
began to drive the enemy to the ridges of Kovaliça and Kunduz (Avghinion) toward 
Eskişehir;  an approximately 30,000-man force, together with heavy cannon, were 
settled into fortifications prepared on the aforementioned ridges.
          Seeing that during this period the promised reinforcement soldiers had still not 
come, the army sent the following telegram to the Ministry of War:

          Command of the Army of Asia Minor                                             11 – 3 – 21
          General Staff Office 1                                                                          Secret

                                                 To the Ministry of War in Athens

                                                  To the Central General Staff Office

          As a continuation to my report number 4062 of 8 – 3 – 21, in addition to the 
reinforcement soldiers requested in this report for the reinforcement of military units,
 I have the honor to request that the reinforcement soldiers required for health 
services be sent to the below-mentioned disembarkation points:

          To Izmir                                                        quartermasters                     5
                                                                                sergeants                             20
                                                                                corporals                             37
                                                                                regular army nurses           123
                                                                                assistant nurses                    54
                                                                                stretcher-bearers                501
                                                                                total                                    740

          To Sakız                                                      quartermasters                     5
                                                                              (should be locally hired)      8
                                                                                corporals                           39
                                                                                regular army nurses         161
                                                                                assistant nurses                  13
                                                                                stretcher-bearers               423
                                                                                total                                  650

          To Izmit                                                      quartermasters                      1
                                                                              (locally hired)                       2
                                                                                corporals                             9
                                                                                regular army nurses          50
                                                                                assistant nurses                 30
                                                                                stretcher-bearers                95
                                                                                total                                  185

          Method of transmission:                                                           Army Commander
          To the Izmir Health Office Directorate                                             Papoulas
          To the Second Infantry Division
          To the Third Army Corps

 second battle of inönü ile ilgili görsel sonucu

          The army’s north group, which engaged in a battle in front of the Kovaliça and
 Kunduz fortifications, was by 13 March driving the enemy back step by step and 
advancing.  On an aforementioned day the battle took on a more fierce nature.

          The following telegram sent to the government reflects the predicament of the 
army, which had entered the battle based on the promises of the Ministry that 
reinforcements would be sent, but which, by 16 March, had received no 
reinforcements  whatsoever:

          Command of the Army of Asia Minor                                               Bursa
          General Staff Office 1                                                                    16 – 3 – 21

                                                        To the Ministry of War in Athens
                                                            To the General Staff Office

          To be sent at top priority.

          Because the need for reinforcements is urgent, I request that any available 
officers and soldiers be sent as reinforcements.

          Army Commander

          With a separate telegram I requested replenishment of the animal stock:

          Command of the Army of Asia Minor                                                 Bursa
          General Staff Office 1                                                                      16 – 3 – 21
          Number                                                                                       Secret Telegram
          4379                                                                                                 Very Urgent

                                                           To the Ministry of War in Athens
                                                                 To the General Staff Office

          The transport of  any available saddle horses to Mudanya at the first opportunity
 (by the first available means) is absolutely necessary.

         Will also be transmitted to the First Office.
          Army Commander

          As the battle gradually entered a more critical state, the Ministry of War ordered 
the movement of the extra regiment only on 16 March.  As the army sent more 
desperate requests for other reinforcement detachments, the aforementioned Ministry, 
on 17 March,  kindly ordered the sending of new reinforcement detachments.  
However, although the army requested that the aforementioned reinforcements be 
disembarked at Mudanya in order to reinforce the army’s north group, they were 
sent to Izmir instead.

 As soon as the army received the telegram relating this, the following response was 

          Command of the Army of Asia Minor                                                    Bursa
          General Staff Office 1                                                                         18 – 3 – 21
          Secret registry number: 4389                                            To be sent at top priority

                                                           To the Ministry of War in Athens

          The reinforcement detachments sent today should be transported to Mudanya, 
not Izmir.  In the event that the aformentioned reinforcements are en route, this 
information should be sent by radio to the transport ships. 

          Army Commander

          Also sent to the first and fourth offices.

          The same day, the army explained the above telegram with the one below:

          Command of the Army of Asia Minor                                              18 – 3 – 21
          General Staff Office 1                                   Secret registry number 4391/1213

                                                   To the Ministry of War

                                            To the Army General Staff Office

I request that the transport of regular army and reserve officers, as well as soldiers, 
be directed to Mudanya until further notice.  In this regard, I request that the saddle 
horses and mules be sent quickly to Mudanya, as well.

          Army Commander
          To be sent also to the first, third and fourth offices.

2. inönü zaferi ile ilgili görsel sonucu

          Despite the utmost efforts shown by the detachments in the battle and the 
remarkable self-sacrifice of the soldiers and officers, with a very few exceptions 
among  the officers, the delay in receiving reinforcements for this operation 
doomed it to failure.

          As can be seen above, each day the army kept renewing its requests to the 
government for the fulfillment of its promises.  On 18 March, at the moment the 
army was demanding the greatest effort and resistance from the detachments, the 
government was made aware of the gravity of the situation with the following 

          Command of the Army of Asia Minor                                   18 – 3 – 21
          Secret registry number: 4232                                                       cipher

                                                To the Ministry of War in Athens
                                                        To the General Staff Office

          The battle which the north group entered into has become difficult because
 of the enemy’s very fierce resistance.  The reinforcement detachments from within
country should be sent as quickly as possible to Mudanya.  I reiterate the urgent 
need for the sending of transport automobiles.

          Army Commander

          As of 18 March, on the one hand, because of the enemy’s fierce resistance and,
 on the other hand, as I informed the government with telegram number 4234, 
because of our soldiers fighting  with hand weapons at many points in the face of 
repeated attacks, the battle took on an exceptional level of violence.

          The next day, after the officers, in particular, were subjected to severe losses,
 I repeated my request to the government regarding the urgent need for officer 

          Command of the Army of Asia Minor
          General Staff Office 1
                                                   To the Ministry of War in Athens
                                                     To the Army General Staff Office

           I request that reserve and regular army officers be transported, along with 
soldiers.    There is an especially urgent need for junior grade infantry officers and
 I again request that they be sent to Mudanya.

          Army Commander

                                                          Retreat Order  
          On the morning of 19 March, however victoriously our side was prosecuting 
their attacks, the result of the battle was already assured. 

          In any case, 3rd Army Corps Commander General Vlachopoulos and 10th 
,Division Commander Linardopoulos came up against stiff enemy resistance and, 
because their reserves were completely wiped out, none remained.  So they first
stopped their advance and then withdrew, forced to take refuge at a fortified line 
4 kilometers behind the positions they had first occupied.  They reported this via 
their chief of staff “Konstantinu”.