TNT History Mini-Series: German 1918 Caucasus Mission/Part I

//Ed. note: In 1928, Retired Colonel Friedrich von der 
Holtz looked back ten years on his role in the German 
expedition to the Caucasus in June 1918, in an article in 
a German  newspaper.  The Turkish General Staff had 
the article  translated into Ottoman Turkish and 
published in its "Askeri Mecmuası" (Military Journal) 
in November 1928. 

German Expedition 1918 click here for background.

Von der Holtz led the 'German Caucasus Expedition' 
and his commander in the campaign was General Kress 
von Kressenstein, who had served in the Ottoman Army 
on the Palestine Front in 1916-17.

Herewith TNT presents the transcribed-translated version
of the Ottoman Turkish translation of von der Holtz's
article.//

Turks in Caucasus 1918 click here for the final of an 11-
part TNT series about the Ottoman Islamic Army of the 
Caucasus, there at the same time as the Germans.



        German soldiers, left, in the Caucasus in 1918.

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From the July 1928 article in "Der Deutsch", issue number 28:
Author: Retired Colonel Friedrich von der Holtz
Turkish translator: Captain Rahmi

Lessons from War History
Why Did We Go to Transcaucasia in 1918?

Ten years have passed since we undertook one of Germany's most 

controversial operations of the Great War.  This was the expedition to

Transcaucasia, which came at great cost but with little to show for it.

General von Gleich recently wrote in an article about our Caucasus 

policy that:

"The most amazing aspect is that even in June 1918 there was still a 

'Pollyanna-esque' hope with regard to the Western Front, yet the war 

situation for the Austrians was serious, as it was for the Turks in Iraq, 

and Palestine was more or less a calamity, while the Bulgarians

were being beaten.  

As for the Caucasus, even if one claims that the Turkish and German 

forces operating there were insignificant, it was completely illogical 

for us to pursue expeditionary plans aimed at having one ally butter 
the bread of another but based ultimately on insufficient forces 
available for the task at hand.

Even now, it is still difficult to discern whether this policy, which calls

to mind Alexander the Great, was the direct product of the Foreign 

Ministry or whether it was the consequence of the Foreign Ministry's

weakness vis-a-vis the military policymakers.  Perhaps we will never

know."

General Gerold von Gleich click here for background. 

He served in the Ottoman Army at Baghdad and after 

the war became a physics professor, specializing in 

relativity.

When one looks at Transcaucasia, I myself conclude that, for the most 

part, the German General Staff  undertook operations beyond its 

capabilities in the Great War and, consequently, the forces required for

decisive victory were weakened.  Essentially, the proper and informed

approach for any soldier is that when opposing a number of enemy

elements one should gather all his forces and attack the strongest of the

enemy elements and ensure, to the extent possible, that not even one

of his battalions is left out of the attack.  The focal point for criticisms

of the General Staff always center on this aspect. 

In the Great War, the problem of leadership and administration for us 

was that we were mostly entering new and unfamiliar situations, so it

became impossible to reconcile these problems with just great zeal and 

force, even in simple circumstances.  Many times, both tactically and 

strategically, decisions that ignored and even went contrary to lessons 

learned in old battles needed to be made.  

This is exactly what happened in the Transcaucasia expedition! In June

1918, certainly it was not an easy decision for the German General 

Staff to send a contingent of 3,000 troops of various disciplines to the

land of the Golden Fleece.  The impetus for the General Staff's decision

was not the beautiful eyes of Circassian girls nor was it plans for
fantasy victories.  On the contrary, the motivation came from the most
basic and practical perspectives, which would turn the basis for
wartime leadership and administration on its head. 

 

        The Ottoman Islamic Army of the Caucasus in 1918.

//END of PART I//