Ottoman forces in Palestine in the aftermath of the fall
of Jerusalem to the British.//
Status of the Army
Let me give the status situation: after the fall of Jerusalem it would
have been impossible for our army not to realize the end result of
trying to defend this vast, stubborn battlefront. Forget about launching
an assault, the army had no strength left for its own self-defense, as
the troop numbers dwindled. Urgent efforts were made to draft
recruits through the local military bureaus, but not more than a few
young and old men were available because the well of reserves had
long since run dry.
After waiting many months, a few hundred soldiers were sent in,
having been recruited with great difficulty in the name of the Yıldırım
Army Group (YAG). But these weren't hearty soldiers under arms.
Rather, they were hospital dischargees and deserters rounded up from
here and there. Essentially, those fighting on the front line were only
Turks from Anatolia.
Since the Arab soldiers weren't trustworthy, they served in the rear,
at the way-stations and in the stores depots. Most of the Arabs didn't
like us and some of them helped the enemy openly and others secretly.
So we were trying to defend Arabia against both the enemy and the
Arabs themselves.
The army's losses could not be refilled and the ranks were diminishing
further each day. A 2,000-strong division dwindled to near nothing. A
normal division would have between 1,000-1,500 soldiers but these
divisions shrunk to battalion or even regimental size. Consequently, the
divisions were unable to perform the duties assigned for an original
force of 10,000 armed soldiers. The number of soldiers, officers, gear,
ammunition - in other words, everything had changed for the worse.
So only the names of the divisions remained in tact, the same as they
had always been called in the Ottoman Army, but with one tenth the
strength. Why weren't these weakened divisions combined into one
relatively stronger unit? In that way, it would have been much more
efficient and easier to take care of the army. Why wasn't it done?
There is no need to scratch your head, the reason was clear.
At first blush, the YAG's army corps and divisions seemed well-stocked
with troops but in reality they were quite weak. There were 25-30,000
men under arms and, of course, the rear support soldiers were not part
of this number. If they were included, the number of YAG troops
amounted to about 100,000. In any event, these forces were spread
along the front from the Mediterranean Sea to Medina.
As I have said, divisions that rarely had 1,000 troops were defending
portions of the front 5-10 kilometers long. So you can get an idea of the
reality facing our entire 100,000-strong army, with proportional war
material and equipment, as it tried to resist a large and well-outfitted
enemy army.
And there was no reserve forces of ours in the immediate rear, which
every army or army corps would normally have. There was an army
HQS at Aleppo with two army corps but this force was unable to come
to the aid of the YAG when needed - the two armies were so far apart
that it would take at least two months for relief forces to arrive overland.
//END of PART V//
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