TNT History Archives: Ottoman Army's Retreat From Palestine (1918)/Part VI

//Ed. note:  At this point in his story, Major Vecihi relates
a few interesting anecdotes about a variety of subjects.

One gets the impression that he came to the YAG from
the Galicia front in Romania, although he doesn't 
explicitly say so.//



The transport capacity of the Hicaz Railway links between Damascus
and Amman and between Der'a and Tafile was so limited that even
one day's provisions for the army could not be transported.  An army
corps at Homs that belonged to the 2nd Army, which was at Aleppo,
came from Galicia and its divisions were immediately included in the
Yıldırım Army Group (YAG). 

The 43rd Division at Cebel-i Lübnan (Mount Lebanon), previously at
the HQS at Aleppo and then at Homs, was combined with a detachment
of a few hundred soldiers at Tedmür and put under the command of the
army corps that came from Galicia.  The 43rd Division was assigned to
guard the Mediterranean shore together with a few local Gendarmerie
battalions and a Mevlevi regiment with two battalions. 


                                  The Mevlevi Regiment

But the 'Mevlevi regiment' was that in name only, since there were no
descendants of the grandfathers that once comprised it.  There was,
though, a volunteer group from the Mevlevi regiment at Damascus but
they weren't fighters. Rather, it was an entertainment group.  When I
was in Damascus I went to a few dinners where I listened to the
harmonies these elderly fellows played on their flutes and lutes.

There was also an army corps of the 2nd Army stationed at Adana.  It
was manned much like the 15th Army Corps at Homs and its duty was
to guard the Mediterranean shoreline from Side to Mersin, with never
more than 5-6,000 troops. 

With regard to meals for such a weakened army, the situation was quite

dismal.  Although, when the troops on this front were commanded by 

Turks (as opposed to Germans?) they were better off.  In every matter,

from meals to health to whatever, there was a different structure and 

approach.  For example, when under pressure during the Battle of Gaza,

telegrams could be sent to the commanders, governors and other 

officials at Aleppo, Damascus and Adana, with a response coming back

in 24 hours and the needed soldiers, ammunition, grain, flour, sandbags,

etc. procured. 

Equally odd, the trains couldn't maintain a set schedule because they

were fueled with wood.  So army commanders would somehow,

seemingly by magic, have to get the engineers and train crews to 

deliver soldiers and ammunition to a particular place at a particular 

time.  How could the commanders do this? Because they had a sixth

sense of sorts, enabling them to calculate how many troops they could

get from a particular detachment, what kind of grain they could get 

from a particular depot, how many sacks and bags they could get from 

a province or a district.  

These commanders knew how to address someone, based on that 

person's aptitude, and the commander's word was the law. Punishment

was administered harshly. No one had the luxury of inaction or delayed

reaction.  I don't know about the public at large, but in the army, and 

especially during war, this type of discipline is appropriate.  

However, during the retreat from Sinai to Palestine, when administration 

was turned over to the Germans, the order within the army broke down.

General Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein was the

commander of Ottoman forces in the Sinai Desert.

//END of PART VI//