//Ed. note: at the conclusion of his report, Italian
Capt. I. Revol had some surprisingly frank
comments on the deceptively easy Italian victory,
enabled by a poor performance by the Turks and
the support of the Greek populace of Rhodes.//
Critique
This operation is one of the best examples of the
Turkish-Italian War
and one that gives honor to the commander who designed and
arranged
it, as well as to the units that implemented it. In light of this level of
perfect success,
one would think that there would be nothing left to say.
So shouldn’t
such a victory be attributed to all the measures and
arrangements taken
by he who designed the operation?
Nevertheless, in large measure, one must accept that this
victory can be
attributed to the state and position of the Turkish units, the fact
that
they showed no ability to attack and, as of 4 May, their rapid
disintegration, for which there is much evidence. General Ameglio
essentially was a shepherd
easily gathering up a herd of sheep. The
Turks gave in to their fears and superstitions and cowered among
themselves,
finding salvation only in confused flight.
In the event that General Ameglio’s three columns had confronted
a
genuine enemy detachment, they may very well have found themselves
in a
difficult and dangerous situation and may even have been defeated
before they
were able to join up together. Such a
situation would have
been a classic application of ‘iç hat’ (interior lines)
fundamentals and
foundations.
Had the
Turks acted opposite of the inaction they displayed, it would
have been
sufficient for them to have put a few brave and bold soldiers
as far ahead as
possible on the roads leading to Psithos to get timely
information on the
Italians’ advance and to stop them during the night.
And while the Bersagliye and Alp units were preparing to land at
Malona and Kalavarda, a few Turkish rifle shots may very
well have
prevented these columns from successfully meeting up, as they
eventually did.
But the Italians’ luck was not limited to just the Turks’
complete failure
to act. At the same
time, the local Greek population provided the
Italians with whatever assistance
they needed. The fishermen along
the
shore helped the units as they made landing and the local Greeks in
the
interior guided the three Italian columns along those very difficult
roads.
Only this amount of favorable circumstances could have
enabled the
Alp units, somewhat confused and green, but nevertheless
well-trained,
to emerge with a victory.
The battle that followed the night march was more violent
than can be
imagined. The Italian
casualties constitute evidence of this opinion.
The losses suffered by the Turks were more severe and significant
because they were fighting out in the open.
The Turks were more
concerned with saving their own lives than with
honor and glory.
Nonetheless, despite
this self-preservation attitude by the Turks, they
still suffered dead and
wounded of more than 100, which was about
10 percent of their force. The Turks lost 83 dead and only 26 wounded,
which is quite meaningful in this context.
In summary, the activity that took place on the island of
Rhodes gives a
clear picture of the state of the Gençtürk Army at that
time. Certainly,
this activity was
observed with great interest by the
Serbs, Greeks and
Bulgarians, with regard to the actions they were
contemplating for the
near future, in that they saw definite opportunities and
incentives which
gave them more strength and boldness than they could have
foreseen,
vis-a-vis the Turks.
//END of PART FIVE/FINAL//
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