TNT History Mini-Series: Turk & Armenians Battle for Nakhchivan (1920)/Part IV

//Ed. Note: The battles at Dehne Pass and Qarabağlar rage
on, as the Turks work their way north toward Sederek on 
the border between Nakhchivan and Armenia.//



The battles discussed took place near "QIVRAQ" (in red
on the left near the border), around Shah Tahtı to the left 
and Qarabağlar (Karabağlar) on the right, northwest of 
Nakhchivan city.

On 7 November, the enemy was caught completely off guard.  In
addition, the mistakes the enemy made in the organization of its
defenses and its elements being scattered, invited disaster.

The enemy was in 3 groups – at Huncav, Xok and the Aras valley,
where fortifications had been built and one each battalion stationed.
A four-cannon battery was positioned south of Xok and another
battery was held in reserve at Qarabağlar. 

The hills about a kilometer in front of the fortifications were left
vacant and observation was neglected so the Turkish detachment
was able to approach without being noticed by the enemy.  Based
on the preparation mentioned above, the operation began suddenly
and the enemy guards’ heedlessness helped us, as well.

In short, the enemy paid the price for not separating its security and
defense lines from one another. The fact that  the Huncav
detachment’s rear was taken shows that there was not communication
between the groups and commanders.  Although Turkish forces had
reached Shah Tahtı, Huncav was embroiled in its own front.  Not
paying attention to what is happening on the side or in the rear
always invites disaster.  The regimental commander at Qarabağlar
was so unaware of the situation that he didn’t realize that Shah Tahtı
had been occupied.  While our battalion set off toward Qarabağlar he
was sending a battery under his command from Qarabağlar via the
Kuyrak road, along with a report that he had written to the Division
Command, to Shah Tahtı.  Of course, we intercepted both the battery
and the report.

Taking advantage of the terrain, and in the context of their instructions,

the troops effectively moved from the flanks toward the enemy.  Each
company had one Lewis gun under the order of the company
commander and these could be moved wherever the need might be,
which was very beneficial.


The Aras River separates Nakhchivan from Iran to the south.

As in other places, here, too, I witnessed the soldiers’ state of mind. 
They did not fire at the enemy fleeing 20-30 meters ahead of them,
wanting to take them alive.  But the ground was very soft and muddy,
making both sides weary.  Those fleeing could not advance and their
pursuers could make no headway either.  This state of mind was
proof of the fine character of the Turks, who were created that way.

The effort against the enemy from the rear, on the way to Huncav in
the darkness of the evening, proved fruitful and the way opened up for
our militia battalion, which scoured the landscape en route to
Qarabağlar.  Meanwhile, the 34the Regiment  2nd Battalion moved to
Xok to be in reserve but the troops were unable to rest until after
midnight.  This 26-hour march and battle resulted in success.  The
next day, the troops resumed their march and reached the head of the
Dehne Pass.  Ammunition was low. During a lull there was an effort
to resupply the ammunition, at which time there were some minor
clashes.

                                                                                              2

The Battle of 15 November 1920

The enemy was positioned at the Dehne Pass, which has very steep
hills.  Based on clashes and reconnaissance up to 15 November, it was
understood that the enemy had 8 field guns and two regiments of
infantry.

As can be seen from an examination of map number 3, the Armenian
militia troops in the area of Arpaçay were in a position to affect the
Turkish detachment’s flank and rear.  At first, the enemy was quite
active, ambushing and raiding with its armored train and rarely
showing the courage to emerge from the Dehne Pass.

Inside the map, top center with the flag, is the Armenian
stronghold of Qarabağlar (Karabağlar). To the left, the town
shown is Qıvraq.  Shah Tahtı is left of Qıvraq, off the map.


The Turkish detachment was only able to observe the 25-kilometer
front and its entire force was gathered at Başmevdasin (map number 4).

Map Number 4

Situation as of 15 November at 8 o’clock

Legend:

Detachment Command

Infantry sentry

Hunter line

Company

Battalion

Cavalry company

Cavalry team

Detachment’s attack direction

Advancing enemy hunters

Enemy position

Enemy cavalry sentry

Enemy armored train

Enemy cavalry troops

Armenians’ planned attack movement direction

Dehne Pass is on the left, where the road and the rail line
squeeze through to go north.


It was not possible to resupply the ammunition. Each infantryman had
45 bullets for his rifle and the cavalrymen had at most 10 bullets each.

In this circumstance, it was deemed inadvisable to attempt an attack. 
The troops would be kept busy with training until the ammunition
arrived.  There were 500 infantrymen and 250 cavalrymen.  The
refugees returned to their retaken villages but they had no weapons
 and they were hungry. The troops had one month worth of food.

The enemy’s newly created situation

The detachment was in a weak condition with regard to ammunition.
The following information was received at 7 o’clock n 15 November:

An enemy force of 150 infantrymen and 100 cavalrymen was coming
from the direction of Karabulak; another force of unknown strength
with a cannon was advancing from Bağcı; for an attack in the direction
of Nevraşin.

Discussion of the situation

Since ammunition was insufficient for defense and because the enemy 
attack would come from two sides, there was the danger of being taken
prisoner.

The populace, which had just been able to return to their land, were 
frightened and their men, whom we counted on as reinforcements, 
would flee in order to save their families; doing the needful with just
200 regular troops would not be possible; consequently, a portion 
of the enemy opposite the detachment would be able to reinforce their
own main army.

By keeping an eye on the enemy troops at Dehne, we could come up 
from behind the enemy, which was attacking with all its force in the 
direction of Karabulak.  This would be a particularly dangerous attempt
 – diving into the enemy force and risking being surrounded.

Each of these three situations were inopportune and dangerous for the
detachment.  Nevertheless, there was a chance of success with the third
option, while the others were completely unacceptable.  The aspect
that offered success was the detachment’s high morale and the
Armenians’ inexperience with battle movement and management.
Consequently, the decision was made to make a counterattack to the
enemy’s rear, before the enemy force at Dehne could make a move. 

//End of Part IV//