Turks and Armenians north of Nakhchivan city in November
1920 that literally and figuratively reflects the 'fog of war'.//
The bulk of the Turkish detachment moved northwest from
Nakhchivan toward Shah Tahtı (Shakhtakhty). A separate
battle, described below in detail, happened between
Nakhchivan and Karabağlar, which lies northeast of
Shah Tahtı.
The 18th Regiment 1st Battalion began to advance for attack at
8 o’clock. The infantry was restrained from firing. Only the heavy
machine guns were allowed to be fired. At 9 o’clock the enemy’s first
line was occupied. The reserve 34th Regiment 2nd Battalion followed
the 1st Battalion on the right. When the 1st Battalion came near to the
enemy’s second line, its right flank was surrounded by the enemy.
This surrounding force of the enemy was then subjected to side fire
from our reserve battalion and the heavy machine gun company. The
1st Battalion lost 10 martyrs, one of them an officer, and there were 23
wounded.
Our militia cavalry: They were not well managed because they had no
cavalry leaders knowledgeable about cavalry warfare. The cannon that
was put under cavalry command was not used at all. Our cavalry sat on
their horses for hours, riding from here to there. Once Xok was
occupied, the cavalry gathered and came to Xok, which was a very
good decision. The cavalry was then sent to pursue the enemy, which
was moving along the road.
No word was received from the militia battalion in the direction of
Huncav. But the continuing sound of firing on that front showed that
the enemy was persevering. In order to establish communications with
the militia battalion, an officer reconnaissance arm had been sent earlier
but this cavalry reconnaissance arm was not able to do its duty. Because
of the fog in the northern portion of the front, it was impossible to see
anything. When the detachment’s reserve, which was in the position
that will be explained below, turned that way it encountered the cavalry
reconnaisance arm just 500 meters from the flank.
A New Situation
We occupied Xok. The cavalry was sent to pursue the enemy along
the road. We were surrounded by fog. At our rear, our line of retreat
was under threat. Our militia battalion, the enemy forces persevering in
their resistance and the reserves were all unknowns for us. We were in
the enemy’s line of retreat and they were in ours: the Turkish
detachment had dived into the enemy front and gone 2.5 kilometers
behind the enemy. (Map 3)
Map 3: Situation as of 1130 hours and the subsequent operation.
While the main Turkish force headed from Xok
toward Shah Tahtı (road running left), a battalion swung
to the rear of the Armenians (right).
The only thing to do in this situation was to move immediately and
without delay in two directions to take the enemy’s rear.
Complementing the cavalry militia’s move toward Shah Tahtı to take
the enemy’s rear, the reserve battalion headed for for the back of the
enemy forces that were defending the northern portion of their position.
Meanwhile, it was deemed appropriate for the 1st Battalion to remain
in the vicinity of Xok, from where it could move in any direction, until
the situation clarified, to thwart the expected attack by the enemy from
Qarabağlar, which we considered to be a very dangerous possibility.
The reserve battalion (34the Regiment 2nd Battalion) and a heavy
machine gun company were sent to the rear of the enemy, which was
resisting on the Hunhav front. The terrain was rocky and the fog
persisted. The local Turks, who knew the area well, accompanied the
battalion into the fog. Our cavalry reconnaissance arm went along,
too, as the difficult march proceeded carefully through the brush.
When the battalion reached a ridge at 1530 hours, a scout provided the
following information:
The enemy position was on the opposite bank of a stream just ahead.
Because of the fog and the encroaching darkness, descending down the
steep stream banks and fording the stream would take at least half an
hour. There was a significant danger is allowing this 120-man battalion
to remain in this unfamiliar terrain filled with fog and darkness. And
there was no chance of disregarding the darkness and pressing on.
Consequently, before darkness fell completely, this situation had to be
resolved. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion at Xok, assuming that no
danger remained on the way to Shah Tahtı, headed toward Qarabağlar.
The battle described occurred to the north of Nakhchivan city.
(center in yellow) on the way to Karabağlar.
So, based on the considerations stated above and the impossibility of
these 120 fighters completely capturing the enemy spread out over a
broad front, in fog no less, or of even striking an effective blow against
them, the decision was made to frighten the enemy:
Machine guns were positioned along the Qarabağlar-Huncav road and
fired into the fog in the direction of the enemy’s rear. After a few
rounds, the fog lifted. All our men, fighters and non-fighters, were
ordered to proclaim themselves so that the enemy would think there
were more of us than there actually were. At this time, a 40-50-man
cavalry group and some infantrymen coming from Qarabağlar were
attacking but they were halted by our machine gun fire. As darkness
fell, the enemy in their defensive positions were at each others’ throats,
scrambling to escape toward the north and the mountains. They had
to be prevented from mounting a counterattack.
In the face of a serious enemy attack effort, the detachment, which
was itself in a scattered state, had to finish off the operation with a
terrifying blow before darkness fell entirely. It was not possible to
seize all of the enemy fighters, behind whom we were positioned.
Nevertheless, the detachment’s advance troops reached the Posyan-
Kuyrak line on 7 November and took 180 enemy fighters prisoner
and seized 4 cannons and their wagons, 11 heavy machine guns – 6
of them with their carriages, a horse, a transport automobile and the
warehouses at Shah Tahtı. Most of the enemy troops were withdrawn
via the railway on trains that were readied as the hours passed.
In their pursuit, the cavalry militia was not as successful as hoped
because during the battle they had ridden their horses around to
exhaustion. They could not proceed beyond Kuyrak in their pursuit.
Only one cavalry company was able to go, with difficulty, as far as
Posyan by midnight. But, of course, there was nothing to be gained
by this since the enemy was not about to wait there for us.
Nevertheless, during this mutually damaging battle, the Armenians
confirmed that they could be duped. The Armenians considered the
intent of the cavalry to enter their lines so important that they
allocated most of their forces and 8 cannon to the front where, in fact,
only the cavalry was located. However, this benefit did not outweigh
the damage done. The real damage was the fact that we had not been
able to seize Dehne Boğazı (pass) before the enemy. If the cavalry
had moved and been well-managed this goal might have been achieved.
It would have been suitable if, during the attempted attack of 4
November, the local militia had been given over to the battalion and
the bulk of the cavalry kept close by. But since the cavalry considered
itself independent,it acted according to its own preferences. During
the Dehne battle, it was seen that the cavalry did not move in the
direction it was supposed to. This cavalry was not part of the Turkish
Army, being made up of militias and Bolsheviks.
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