16 Aralık 2018 Pazar

TNT History Mini-Series: Turks & Armenians Battle for Nakhchivan (1920)/Part II

//Ed. Note: The Turkish detachment in Nakhchivan 
prepares for an attack on Armenian forces in the south 
as part of a coordinated Turkish 3-pronged push toward
Yerevan in November 1920.  Dates in the article are
about 2 weeks early because of calendar discrepancies
in those days.//


turkey armenia war nakhchivan 1920 ile ilgili görsel sonucu

Discussion of the Situation:

Although the enemy front surrounded the Nakhchivan area, their 
regular forces were around Shah Tahtı.  The other areas were manned 
by  Armenian militias, whose ability to strike into our territory was 
quite limited.  Only the Armenian militias in the area from Cehri to the
 north of Shah Tahtı posed any threat to the detachment.

Consequently, this was the most appropriate plan: an attack against 
Shah Tahtı, securing the detachment’s flank against the mountainous 
area and keeping an eye on the other locations.

In order for this plan to be successfully implemented, an immediate 
attack would be required and after the enemy’s regular troops were 
annihilated the remaining militias on the other fronts would lose their 
nerve.

In order to secure the flank, it was possible to take advantage of the 
populace in the vicinity of Cehri. In addition to all of the Turks there
being brave fighters, the boldness and courage of the Cehri populace
was superior to others.

How fast should the detachment attack Shah Tahtı?

The enemy had an approximately 18-kilometer long front.  The bulk of 
its forces and reserves were either in Shah Tahtı or were from Karabağ. 
One flank was on the Aras River and the other against the mountains. 
The Aras was impassable for them but they could move to their own 
areas through the mountains.  So, we had to squeeze the enemy between
 the Aras River and our Turkish bayonets. To do this we found it suitable
 to attack the enemy’s northeastern flank between Huncav and Aztaburt
 by distracting them at the front. 

türk ermeni savaşı 1920 ile ilgili görsel sonucu

Reminder:
When two sides are opposite each other for a long time, they each learn
the other’s capabilities and weaknesses.  Here, too, the detachment 
commander included morale strength in his calculations.  In addition, 
through exhaustive study, it was possible to build a profile of the 
enemy by examing its battle history.  Also, the populace’s opinion of 
the enemy had been confirmed with battle experience.

Decision:
Based on the results of this discussion, our forces were divided as 
follows:

1 – In order to secure the front, 200 Cehri militia men under the 
command of an officer went toward Payız;
2 – The entire detachment, along with 150 militia men went toward
Sevset Huncav;
3- To distract and confuse:

a – Militia cavalry came from both sides of the Nakhçivan
-Shah Tahtı road.
b – A 70-man militia attacked from the Aras River valley.

Approach march will be done at night and the attack at dawn.

Implementation:

The infantrymen began at 1200 hours and the cavalry at 1400 hours, 
at which time a fierce storm erupted.  The soldiers reached their march
 targets after midnight, following a very difficult slog through muddy 
land and overnighted in the open.  However, unfortunately, because of 
circumstances unforseen by the detachment, the cavalry militia 
returned to Nakhçivan at night.  The detachment became aware of this
 development toward dawn and, although the reasons for the return 
were not understood, it was assumed that the reasons must have been 
serious ones so the detachment returned, as well, postponing the attack.
During the detachment’s return, though, the Armenian outposts were 
able to observe this voluntary retreat in detail because by this time it 
was daylight.  Nevertheless, the detachment’s hopes were bolstered by
the possibility that the Armenians might be caught off guard once again.

türk ermeni savaşı 1920 ile ilgili görsel sonucu

Upon returning to Nakhçivan, it became clear that the only reason for 
the cavalry’s withdrawal had been  the stormy cold weather!  The 
Cehri detachment attacked and reached its target at the determined time
and, subsequently, took its previous positions.

The decision was made to re-launch the attack on 7 November.  To 
limit problems and to move closer to the cavalry militias, forces were 
sent along a closer, well-tended road that was better than the winding 
and bumpy Sevset road, and divided up and sent to the main focal point
of the attack in the following manner:

1-      The bulk of forces north of the road (2 infantry battalions, 1 heavy 
machine gun, 3 Lewis gun
2-      The 150-man militia battalion via Huncav
3-      Cavalry sent from south of the road (cannons under cavalry 
command)
4-      The 70-man militia battalion would attack via the Aras valley, as 
before

The decision changed between the first attempt and the second attempt.  
The terrain, the condition of the militias and the 18-kilometer length of the
front argued for a less ambitious victory.  Problems such as fatigue and the
impossibility of launching a united attack showed themselves even before
the start of the battle.  There were only two machines available for 
telephone communications and 4-5 kilometers of cable.

Greater care was shown for the 7 November attack, with regard to 
giving the soldiers a rest along the approach march – a lesson learned 
from the preceding attempt.  At night, half way through the march, the 
soldiers were given tea and a rest in back of the forward outposts.
At dawn, the troops approached to a kilometer from the enemy 
positions.  

The main force deployed as shown on map number 2.
For the Shah Tahtı battle of 7 November 1920

Operations implemented between 8 and 9 o’clock















Legend: (upper left)

                Detachment staff
                Battalion
                Hunter company
                Infantry reconnaissance arm
                Cavalry reconnaissance arm
                Health detachment
                Enemy defensive positions.

//End of Part II//

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