prepares for an attack on Armenian forces in the south
as part of a coordinated Turkish 3-pronged push toward
Yerevan in November 1920. Dates in the article are
about 2 weeks early because of calendar discrepancies
in those days.//
Discussion of the Situation:
Although the enemy front surrounded the Nakhchivan area, their
regular forces were around Shah Tahtı. The other areas were manned
by Armenian militias, whose ability to strike into our territory was
quite limited. Only the Armenian militias in the area from Cehri to the
north of Shah Tahtı posed any threat to the detachment.
Consequently, this was the most appropriate plan: an attack against
Shah Tahtı, securing the detachment’s flank against the mountainous
area and keeping an eye on the other locations.
In order for this plan to be successfully implemented, an immediate
attack would be required and after the enemy’s regular troops were
annihilated the remaining militias on the other fronts would lose their
nerve.
In order to secure the flank, it was possible to take advantage of the
populace in the vicinity of Cehri. In addition to all of the Turks there
being brave fighters, the boldness and courage of the Cehri populace
was superior to others.
How fast should the detachment attack Shah Tahtı?
The enemy had an approximately 18-kilometer long front. The bulk of
its forces and reserves were either in Shah Tahtı or were from Karabağ.
One flank was on the Aras River and the other against the mountains.
The Aras was impassable for them but they could move to their own
areas through the mountains. So, we had to squeeze the enemy between
the Aras River and our Turkish bayonets. To do this we found it suitable
to attack the enemy’s northeastern flank between Huncav and Aztaburt
by distracting them at the front.
Reminder:
When two sides are opposite each other for a long time, they each learn
the other’s capabilities and weaknesses. Here, too, the detachment
commander included morale strength in his calculations. In addition,
through exhaustive study, it was possible to build a profile of the
enemy by examing its battle history. Also, the populace’s opinion of
the enemy had been confirmed with battle experience.
Decision:
Based on the results of this discussion, our forces were divided as
follows:
1 – In order to secure the front, 200 Cehri militia men under the
command of an officer went toward Payız;
2 – The entire detachment, along with 150 militia men went toward
Sevset Huncav;
3- To distract and confuse:
a – Militia cavalry came from both sides of the Nakhçivan
-Shah Tahtı road.
b – A 70-man militia attacked from the Aras River valley.
Approach march will be done at night and the attack at dawn.
Implementation:
The infantrymen began at 1200 hours and the cavalry at 1400 hours,
at which time a fierce storm erupted. The soldiers reached their march
targets after midnight, following a very difficult slog through muddy
land and overnighted in the open. However, unfortunately, because of
circumstances unforseen by the detachment, the cavalry militia
returned to Nakhçivan at night. The detachment became aware of this
development toward dawn and, although the reasons for the return
were not understood, it was assumed that the reasons must have been
serious ones so the detachment returned, as well, postponing the attack.
During the detachment’s return, though, the Armenian outposts were
able to observe this voluntary retreat in detail because by this time it
was daylight. Nevertheless, the detachment’s hopes were bolstered by
the possibility that the Armenians might be caught off guard once again.
Upon returning to Nakhçivan, it became clear that the only reason for
the cavalry’s withdrawal had been the stormy cold weather! The
Cehri detachment attacked and reached its target at the determined time
and, subsequently, took its previous positions.
The decision was made to re-launch the attack on 7 November. To
limit problems and to move closer to the cavalry militias, forces were
sent along a closer, well-tended road that was better than the winding
and bumpy Sevset road, and divided up and sent to the main focal point
of the attack in the following manner:
1- The bulk of forces north of the road (2 infantry battalions, 1 heavy
machine gun, 3 Lewis gun
2- The 150-man militia battalion via Huncav
3- Cavalry sent from south of the road (cannons under cavalry
command)
4- The 70-man militia battalion would attack via the Aras valley, as
before
The decision changed between the first attempt and the second attempt.
The terrain, the condition of the militias and the 18-kilometer length of the
front argued for a less ambitious victory. Problems such as fatigue and the
impossibility of launching a united attack showed themselves even before
the start of the battle. There were only two machines available for
telephone communications and 4-5 kilometers of cable.
Greater care was shown for the 7 November attack, with regard to
giving the soldiers a rest along the approach march – a lesson learned
from the preceding attempt. At night, half way through the march, the
soldiers were given tea and a rest in back of the forward outposts.
At dawn, the troops approached to a kilometer from the enemy
positions.
The main force deployed as shown on map number 2.
For the Shah Tahtı battle of 7 November 1920
Operations implemented between 8 and 9 o’clock
Legend: (upper left)
Detachment staff
Battalion
Hunter company
Infantry reconnaissance arm
Cavalry reconnaissance arm
Health detachment
Enemy defensive positions.
//End of Part II//
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