TNT History Archives: Army Chief Reviews 1897 Turkey-Greece War (1909)/Part II

//Ed. Note: In this portion of his lecture, Ahmed İzzet
Paşa began to explain the military exigencies of the
Thessaly battlespace.//




The Greece war plan was written by Goltz Paşa (Prussian officer
Colmar Freiherr Von der Goltz, who reorganized the Ottoman army
from 1883 to 1896) in 1886.  Goltz Paşa recognized that the Greek
navy was superior to ours so in an extended war the Greeks could
invade the Turkish coast from their Aegean islands with impunity
and take advantage of the Greek population in Turkey, while counting
on Europe for support. 

Woeful status of Turkey's navy in 1897 click here for a 
recent TNT report about ex-Navy Minister Hasan Rami
Paşa's description of the Ottoman Navy during the war.

Consequently, Goltz Paşa's plan would strike a quick death-blow
to the Greek army immediately following a declaration of war. 
For this reason, Goltz Paşa recommended that our main army force be
gathered together at one point.

We had two war operations area commands on the Greek border. One
was at Epir (Yanya) and the other was the Tesalya (Thessaly) command,
with the two being completely separated from one another by the Pend
range.  Since the troop strength of each command was equal, the result
was that both of them were weaker than they should have been.  It
became clear that the two commands had to be brought together.

However, there were many delays in the transport to Yanya.  Also,
even more time was needed for this movement because, right away,
the Agrafa range would be encountered along the way.  But there was
otherwise no significant obstacle in the army's path.  On the Thessaly
side, assembling the force would be comparatively easy and there were
many lines-of-operation there towards Athens. 

This is one of 3 maps that accompanied Ahmed İzzet Paşa's 
lecture.  For reference purposes, Salonica (Thessaloniki) is at 
top right, where the cross is.

In his plan, Goltz Paşa assigned two weak divisions toward Yanya.  He
felt that this small force should be assembled at Yanya and that the
forces at Preveze and Louros should be pulled back. In fact, Preveze
was not a well-defended position, being vulnerable from the sea.  If
we were to try to defend Preveze, the Greeks could attack from land
and sea and, if they were quickly successful, the war would start with
a crushing rout of our forces, creating a bad impression of us in Europe.

Another reason arguing for withdrawl from Narta (Arta) and Louros
was that the lines of communication were parallel.  Defending borders
that run parallel to the line-of retreat is difficult.  In the event that we
were successful in Thessaly, we would be able to re-acquire lands that
we had abandoned to the enemy.  However, this plan was not approved
by the army's administrators at that time.

The thinking was "should positions be abandoned to the enemy
without a fight?".  Yet, war is a crisis, an illness that befalls a nation.
Sometimes a patient you love needs bitter medicine to get better and
this may require some pain and suffering.  If you are unwilling to have
your beloved patient endure a period of discomfort, then you may
give rise to his ultimate destruction.  Similar situations arise in war,
requiring difficult choices and treatments.  One has to be willing to
endure these.  In war, victory is its essence, the main purpose.  Actions
like abandoning land are details that serve the achievement of the goal.
Future commanders who must give up some land should not be
stripped of their command. 

                                 Larissa (Yenişehir)

Goltz Paşa's plan called for the main force made up of six divisions
to assemble on the Thessaly border.  But since it is quite a long border,
rather than spreading  the force too thinly, an assembly point had to be
determined, even if our plan was for us to launch an attack, bearing in
mind where the enemy's main force would be gathering. 

The enemy had essentially three attack routes:  one along the coast
via Katerini down to the plain of Salonica - the route the Romans took
in their pursuit of Perseus; one via the Alasonya (Elassona) - Servia
road; and the third via Kalambaka - Dişkata - Grebene - Nasliç
(Lapçişte, Neopolis), with Salonica being the enemy's main target. 

Although there were Greeks living all along the border, as one
advanced along the Dişkata - Grebene line, valliant Moslems would be
encountered and there were no significant targets on this route, either. 
Consequently, it made more sense for the Greeks to make their attack
via either the first or the second route.  In addition, in such a situation,
the Greek army would be able to maintain contact with its navy. So, it
became clear that the Greek army would assemble in the Yenişehir
(Larissa) plain. 

In any event, regardless of the route chosen by the enemy, we had to
assemble a larger force to ensure victory in battle and not fear an
attack.  Because we would then be able to counterattack by threatening
the enemy's flank and rear.  However, in this situation we would have
to keep the enemy's assembly point and second-degree routes under
observation and, if need be, gain time to erect fortifications.  Our main
force, though, would gather at a point amenable to an attack on the
enemy's jugular.

//END of PART II//