TNT History Archives: Army Chief Reviews 1897 Turkey-Greece War (1909)/Part V

//Ed. note:  Continuing on with his lecture in 1909, Ahmed
İzzet Paşa for the first time started to relate his personal
role in the Thessaly battles of Spring 1897.//


At this point in his lecture, Ahmed İzzet Paşa
explained the situation after the battle at 
Melouna (Milona) in mid-April. 

The only ones who handled this retreat calmly were those in the
Smolensky detachment.  Even though we launched a serious pursuit
operation, and although it would have been possible to separate the
Makri division, the Smolensky detachment and the Mavru Mihali
division, their hasty retreat was enabled by our slowness in pursuit.

Our calvary did not conduct reconnaissance and there were hesitations
in our decision-making, both of which hampered our pursuit.  The Greek
Army didn't retreat in fear and chaos but, rather, in a disorderly manner.
Subsequently, Grombikov Paşa went with a cavalry unit and occupied
Yenişehir (Larissa).  On that same day, under the leadership of Ali Rıza,
now the Minister of War (at this juncture, Ahmed İzzet Paşa pointed to
Ali Rıza, who was attending his lecture), we five officers - Col.
Mahmud, Major İzzet Bey, Adjutant Major Mehmed Ali, and Captains
Rıza and Nuri Efendi- arrived at Alasonya (Elassona).

We could not understand the battlefield situation on our left.  The
army's staff officer had gone ahead.  That evening, the Austrian military
attaché brought us the translation of a telegram he had sent to Vienna in
German.  From this telegram were able to understand the status of our
forces, as follows:

6th Division assembled at Kozköy
5th Division at Yenişehir (Larissa)
2nd Division at Tarnuh
4th Division at Mati and Milona (Melouna)
1st Division at Çayhisar
3rd Division at Yenişehir (Larissa)
1 reserve brigade at Alasonya (Elassona)

The battlefield as of 18 April 1897.  Yenişehir

(Larissa) is the city at bottom right. Turkish 

forces were concentrated at Alasonya (Elissona),

upper left.

There was no information at all about the enemy.  Contact had been 

completely lost.  Consequently, we devised a deployment plan, such 

that our main force would assemble between Yenişehir and Tarnuh; 

troops would be sent, with some cavalry, to Zark for reconnaissance  

and defense of our right, and to reinforce the 1st Division; although 

there was a proposal made to split the cavalry division in two and send

one portion to Çatalca (Pharsalos) and the other to Golos (Volo) for 

reconnaissance, this proposal was not approved.  And yet, in light of 

the enemy's paucity of cavalry, there would have been no great harm 

in separating our cavalry in this way. 

The following day, we were sent to Çayhisar to join in the operations

of the 1st Division, which was being sent to Zark.  On 16 April,  we

understood that a division would be sent to establish an army HQS 

in Yenişehir, two divisions would move in front of Yenişehir, Neşat

Paşa's division would be brought to Tarnuh and a cavalry brigade 

and an infantry regiment would head in the direction of Velestino.

This arrangement reflected a small change in our proposal.  The 

advance of the 1st Division to Tirakki (Tırhala) was, in fact, excessive

and not a sensible decision.  

The force sent toward Velestino came in contact with the enemy and

asked for assistance.  Consequently, this force was reinforced with an

infantry regiment and Col. Mahmud Muhtar, who had recently arrived

at the operations HQS (he is now the commander of the Hassa Army

- Imperial Guard Regiments) joined this detachment.  Under the 

direction of the aforenamed individual, an attack was launched on 

Velestino on 18 April.  Since I did not personally participate in this 

battle, I cannot provide any details.  But this much I can say - the

attack on Velestino was an example of courage and honor.  

Since Smolensky had fortified the Velestino outskirts, considered 

to be his flank, and added more troops there, our attack cannot be

characterized as a success.  Consequently, Hakkı Paşa reinforced the

troops there with 3 infantry regiments.  But since there was no longer

a need for excessive cavalry, the cavalry brigade was pulled back to

the division.  

                                        Velestino (red star)

I think it was 18 April when an order came from Istanbul officially

assigning our group to the general staff.  So we reorganized the general

staff into three offices: the first was the intelligence office under Col.

Sabit Bey; the second being the military operations office, where I

was; and the third office dealt with provisioning and support issues.  In

a sense, the army's war organization had been re-formed and re-

assembled.

Since it was, of course, the mandate of this newly established HQS to

acquire information about the enemy, we ordered an officer from the

general staff to accompany the commander of the cavalry division

and tasked him with ensuring that information be obtained about 

the enemy's situation at Çatalca (Pharsalos).  Unfortunately, this did

not happen.

  View of the Battle of Velestino from the Greek perspective.

//END OF PART V//