22 Aralık 2019 Pazar

TNT History Archives: Army Chief Reviews 1897 Turkey-Greece War (1909)/Part VIII/FINAL

//Ed. note:  Finishing up his lecture, Ahmed İzzet Paşa 
revealed a very personal story about himself  at the Battle 
of Çatalca (Farsala).  

His career after Thessaly was just as colorful - returning 
to Yemen, service in the Balkan Wars and World War I
and beyond.  

On 5 December 1920, Ahmed İzzet Paşa came from 
Istanbul with former PM Salih Paşa to meet with 
Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) at Bilecik to try to broker talks
between the Ankara government and England for an end
to the Greek occupation of western Anatolia.  However, 
at the end of the talks, Mustafa Kemal effectively 
kidnapped both Ahmed İzzet Paşa and Salih Paşa back 
to Ankara for 3 months.  (!)

In 1921, Ahmed İzzet Paşa returned to Istanbul to serve
the Ottoman government, for which Atatürk never forgave
him.  He died in 1937, a year before Atatürk.// 


ahmet izzet paşa wikiwand ile ilgili görsel sonucu"
Ahmed İzzet Paşa taking up command of the OttomanArmy 
of the Caucasus during World War I.


I personally went to look for the Paşa.  My goal was have a division
hit the enemy's side and its line-of-retreat.  At that moment, I saw
a column of troops in the distance.   I thought it was Hayri Paşa's
division.  As I moved further ahead I saw that army artillery, without
any infantry, was about to open a line toward the right of the 6th
Division.  There was no sign of Neşat Paşa's (2nd) division but
evidently I had mistakenly thought that the column of troops I saw
was from Hayri Paşa's division, when it was actually from Neşat
Paşa's.

The sounds of cannon and rifle fire were coming not from the
battlefield but from the the distant southwest.  I still could not find
the Paşa and my animal had no strength left to go on.  Consequently,
I told a major at the head of a regiment at the tail end of the troop
column to follow me and I headed toward the right side of the army
artillery.  The major agreed to this.

In this way, I moved forward in somewhat of a daydreaming state, as
the bullets whizzed by, thrilled by the idea of seeing war up close and
with the conviction that this was for our self-defense.  My aim was to
defend the artillery and, in fact, implement a counterattack if the enemy
advanced. I looked behind me to put the troops in order but there was
no one there.  Because of the waves of grain in the fields I couldn't see
much of anything. 

battle of farsala 1897 ile ilgili görsel sonucu"
                              Battle of Çatalca (Farsala)

I turned back right away and found the major where I had left him at
the end point of the division.  I saw that he was leading his men the
wrong way.  He explained that the colonel with him had ordered him
to follow him (this colonel).  Enraged, I attacked the colonel.  My
furious action, along with the gestures of approval coming from the
German military attaché Mr. Morgan, succeeded in persuading
the regiment to head in the direction I wanted.

Doubtless, my action in commandeering a portion of a division was
illegal and improper but on the field of battle a soldier can make no
bigger mistake, in both the practical and the duty sense, than to distance
himself from the action.  In order to rectify this mistake, I took it upon
myself to right the wrong.  As a result, during the night I was able to
defend both our artillery and the entire battlefield. 

Because of the disarray involved in our retreat, we could have suffered
a defeat from the enemy's counterattack.  The fact that the enemy's
counterattack was blunted lay in large part with the fierce forward
movement of Hasan Paşa's brigade.  In battle, attack strategy and
boldness serve to rectify other disadvantages.  The best example of
this is the Battle of Vionville-Mars la Tour (1870) when Prince
Frederick Charles, the Prussian 2nd Army commander, gave the order
for his one and a half army corps to attack the entire army of French
Army commander Bazaine.

mars la tour battle ile ilgili görsel sonucu"
      From Ahmet İzzet Paşa's military history archive. 


So, as Hasan Paşa advanced, the Greeks abandoned their counterattack
and decided to simply defend their position.   But Hasan Paşa and Taki
Bey insisted on continuing the attack and at one-thirty at night they
seized the Çatalca rail station.  In a letter from Istanbul the following
day to Goltz Paşa about 'next steps', the matter of continuing the attack
in the morning was discussed.  Ultimately, although I favored an attack,
the decision was made to desist because of fatigue, lack of ammunition
and provisions.

I don't recall whether there was a discussion about the attack at HQS
but the order given to Neşat Paşa instructed him to remain in place,
gather his troops and put a regiment between himself and the army to
cover that gap.  The order given to Hayri Paşa instructed him to move
out at night and take up a position on Neşat Paşa's right by dawn.
With Neşat Paşa taking up a position to enable him to cut the Dökeme
road, it was clear that the attack would take place the following day.

I don't know who wants to dive into battle with desire and who does not.
But if Neşat Paşa had not allowed the enemy to essentially march in
front of him like a parade; if he had, at least, used some artillery fire;
and if Hayri Paşa had objected to the inaction, then an attack the next
day would have been more likely, the enemy's defeat would have been
an annihilation, the loss of life at Dömeke would have been avoided
and the expedition would have ended 15 days earlier, with a much
better result.  

As I said at the outset of my lecture, it would be impossible to review
the entire expedition by the end of the conference.  Consequently, I
will end here and leave the discussion of the Battle of Dömeke for
another time.

Sketch of the Battle of Domoko, May 17.jpg
 The Battle of Dömeke (Domoko), 17 May 1897.


//END of PART VIII/FINAL//



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