related the details of the Turkish attack on Çatalca (Farsala).
He included an interesting anecdote about an Ottoman
Albanian soldier unknowingly rallying the retreating
Ottoman troops back to the front and to victory.//
The battlefield situation in May 1897. Larissa (Yenişehir)
is at center right, with Farsala straight south of it.
On 23 April, the divisions began to mobilize, heading toward Çatalca
(Farsala) along three routes. The 1st Division was advancing along
the Hacıobası - Teke ridges, which was thought to be the enemy's
flank. Our plan was to leave our wing divisions a bit behind, have the
two central divisions occupy the the enemy front and then bring the
wing divisions around to envelope the enemy. However, the 6th Divsion
lost its way and came into contact with the 3rd Division on the left
flank. Of course, it then took quite a bit of time for the 6th Division to
retrace its steps back to its assigned route.
The vanguard of the 3rd Division raced headlong ahead without looking
back. In marches, though, the smaller units must align with the bigger
units. The large units cannot move with the same speed and alacrity
of the smaller units. Consequently, the vanguard's pace must align
with that of the main force. We once suffered from this same serious
mistake in Yemen (where Ahmed İzzet Paşa spent 3 years -1904-1907).
In any case, the enemy's vanguard had taken up a position on the
hill ridges north of Tatar village. When the 3rd Division's vanguard
encountered the enemy there a clash would be inevitable, but since
the main force was far behind, it could not come to the vanguard's
aid and certain defeat would ensue.
with that of the main force. We once suffered from this same serious
mistake in Yemen (where Ahmed İzzet Paşa spent 3 years -1904-1907).
In any case, the enemy's vanguard had taken up a position on the
hill ridges north of Tatar village. When the 3rd Division's vanguard
encountered the enemy there a clash would be inevitable, but since
the main force was far behind, it could not come to the vanguard's
aid and certain defeat would ensue.
Because the 6th Division had lost its way, much time was lost. Then,
while heading through the Subaşı plain a number of hesistations further
exacerbated this delay. Ultimately, brigade commander Hasan Paşa,
who was at the head of the 6th Division, took a surrepticious short-cut
through rough terrain and rectified the time loss with speed and bravery.
So, the unified action of this brigade and the 3rd Division against the
enemy's vanguard came to fruition in this unusual manner.
Edhem Paşa was the overall Ottoman Army
commander for the 1897 War.
A captain in the 3rd Division gave his overcoat to an orderly to hold.
The orderly was Albanian and didn't know Turkish. Because carrying
weapons and equipment during the march was already quite burdensome
for the orderly, he wore the captain's coat in order to carry it, too. When
the vanguard was beaten and began to retreat, the soldiers saw the
orderly wearing the coat, thought he was an officer and expected orders.
Since the orderly didn't know Turkish, he yelled the only Turkish words
he knew - "forward! forward!" - and rushed ahead. The trumpeters took
their cue from the orderly and played "forward march!" The soldiers
turned around and headed back to the front at the same moment that
Hasan Paşa's brigade fell upon the enemy from the other direction.
//Ed. note: Ahmed İzzet Paşa was himself an Albanian, born
in Manastır province in 1864.//
This pincer movement was too much for the bewildered Greek vanguard
troops, who broke up and ran into their own troops coming to assist them,
drawing their purported saviors into the rout, as well. This is how the
first phase of the Battle of Çatalca came to an end.
while heading through the Subaşı plain a number of hesistations further
exacerbated this delay. Ultimately, brigade commander Hasan Paşa,
who was at the head of the 6th Division, took a surrepticious short-cut
through rough terrain and rectified the time loss with speed and bravery.
So, the unified action of this brigade and the 3rd Division against the
enemy's vanguard came to fruition in this unusual manner.
Edhem Paşa was the overall Ottoman Army
commander for the 1897 War.
A captain in the 3rd Division gave his overcoat to an orderly to hold.
The orderly was Albanian and didn't know Turkish. Because carrying
weapons and equipment during the march was already quite burdensome
for the orderly, he wore the captain's coat in order to carry it, too. When
the vanguard was beaten and began to retreat, the soldiers saw the
orderly wearing the coat, thought he was an officer and expected orders.
Since the orderly didn't know Turkish, he yelled the only Turkish words
he knew - "forward! forward!" - and rushed ahead. The trumpeters took
their cue from the orderly and played "forward march!" The soldiers
turned around and headed back to the front at the same moment that
Hasan Paşa's brigade fell upon the enemy from the other direction.
//Ed. note: Ahmed İzzet Paşa was himself an Albanian, born
in Manastır province in 1864.//
This pincer movement was too much for the bewildered Greek vanguard
troops, who broke up and ran into their own troops coming to assist them,
drawing their purported saviors into the rout, as well. This is how the
first phase of the Battle of Çatalca came to an end.
Since the enemy's position, plans and intentions were not known, our
orders had been issued for the first phase only. In the order we had
issued we only anticipated reaching the Küçük Çınarlı stream's hills.
However, having achieved this vistory so quickly and so early, we
wanted to press on with the battle and pursuit. Subsequently, we got
the necessary orders verbally via a general staff officer.
Firstly, Hamdi Paşa's and Memduh Paşa's divisions entered the battle.
Concurrently, a brigade from Neşat Paşa's 2nd Divison occupied İdris
village and another brigade took the hill to the north of the village. I
had a great deal of difficulty justifying this division's forward
movement.
When the general order was issued, the 1st Division came to the Hacı
encampment. But how? It left one of its brigades at Koçeri as reserve!
Consequently, its force was depleted. So, the order brought by General
Staff Captain Nuri Bey about cutting off the enemy's line-of-retreat
between here and Dömeke (Domokos) could not be executed because
of faulty reasoning and a lack of troops.
The Ottoman divisions equate as follows: (from upper left to
right) Hairi (Hayri)/1st; Neşat/2nd; Haidar (Haydar)/4th;
Hamdi/6th; Memduh/3rd.
As a result, we could not take advantage of this division, in which we
had placed most of our hopes. For the second phase of the battle,
Hasan Paşa's brigade would again be in the lead, along with the
3rd Division's vanguard commanded by Taki Bey.
Seeing that the 1st and 2nd Divisions were elsewhere and that the
main force of the 6th and 3rd Divisions were a bit to the rear,
an emboldened Prince Constantine began a counterattack. This
generated quite a bit of anxiety among us because our orders had
been executed with hesitation and slowness. So, right away the
necessary orders were written and the 6th Division was told to
immediately move with another brigade to shore up Hasan Paşa's
right. Concurrently, Memduh Paşa was verbally ordered to have a
regiment move to Taki Bey's left and to leave a brigade in the
vicinity of Tanarlı as reserve.
//END of PART VII//
orders had been issued for the first phase only. In the order we had
issued we only anticipated reaching the Küçük Çınarlı stream's hills.
However, having achieved this vistory so quickly and so early, we
wanted to press on with the battle and pursuit. Subsequently, we got
the necessary orders verbally via a general staff officer.
Firstly, Hamdi Paşa's and Memduh Paşa's divisions entered the battle.
Concurrently, a brigade from Neşat Paşa's 2nd Divison occupied İdris
village and another brigade took the hill to the north of the village. I
had a great deal of difficulty justifying this division's forward
movement.
When the general order was issued, the 1st Division came to the Hacı
encampment. But how? It left one of its brigades at Koçeri as reserve!
Consequently, its force was depleted. So, the order brought by General
Staff Captain Nuri Bey about cutting off the enemy's line-of-retreat
between here and Dömeke (Domokos) could not be executed because
of faulty reasoning and a lack of troops.
The Ottoman divisions equate as follows: (from upper left to
right) Hairi (Hayri)/1st; Neşat/2nd; Haidar (Haydar)/4th;
Hamdi/6th; Memduh/3rd.
As a result, we could not take advantage of this division, in which we
had placed most of our hopes. For the second phase of the battle,
Hasan Paşa's brigade would again be in the lead, along with the
3rd Division's vanguard commanded by Taki Bey.
Seeing that the 1st and 2nd Divisions were elsewhere and that the
main force of the 6th and 3rd Divisions were a bit to the rear,
an emboldened Prince Constantine began a counterattack. This
generated quite a bit of anxiety among us because our orders had
been executed with hesitation and slowness. So, right away the
necessary orders were written and the 6th Division was told to
immediately move with another brigade to shore up Hasan Paşa's
right. Concurrently, Memduh Paşa was verbally ordered to have a
regiment move to Taki Bey's left and to leave a brigade in the
vicinity of Tanarlı as reserve.
//END of PART VII//
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