forces seized Baku, peripheral problems in Karabağ
with the Armenians led by Zoravar Antranik; with
enemies around Lenkoran to the south of Baku; and
with the growing entrenchment of Bicherekhov in
Derbent and Petrovsk, faced the IAC.//
The Seizure of Derbent and Petrovsk
General Zoravar Antranik, center, and his
Armenian fighters.
The substantial Turkish force that laid siege to Baku was comprised
of the 5th and 15th Divisions, along with two regiments from the 36th
Division, but after its capture, there was no need for them to remain.
There was now another more urgent matter that required attention in the
Caucasus. Antranik, one of the leaders of Armenian irregulars, was
massacring Moslems around Shusha, Kehdus and Zengehzor, especially
after our success in Baku. In Shusha, the center of Karabağ, the
situation of the Moslems was critical and if their situation was not
addressed urgently they would surely be annihilated.
Among the population of the northern Caucasus the situation was quite
critical. Bicherekhov, who had been in Derbent and Petrovsk for a month
and a half, organized his troops and after the fall of Baku many Armenian
forces joined him. Because of the existing situation, no orderly
government could be established in Dagestan and the head of government,
Mecidçeh Meviyef, had not left Tblisi. The land of the northern Caucasus
needed to be cleansed of the enemy so that peace and security could be
restored and an orderly government coul be allowed to operate. In
addition, it was essential for military reasons that the enemies in Derbent
and Petrovsk be repelled. It was clear that if Bicherekhov’s force was
neglected then we would be subjected to an attack on Baku from Derbent.
The defense of Baku, which was in its third and fourth phases, and matter
of military supplies and provisions within Azerbaijan were important
issues coming on the agenda. How long the Turkish Army could stay in
Azerbaijan was in doubt. It was of the utmost importance that the
Azerbaijanis be able to defend themselves. Lastly, there remained the
removal of enemy forces in Lenkoran, located south of the Kura River
delta, on the Caspian Sea coast. The enemy here showed no sign of
moving. In addition, because of Lenkoran’s remoteness from the rail line,
it would be impossible to use the troops to be sent there in any other duty
a month prior to deployment. And since the sea was controlled by the
enemy it would be extremely difficult to return these troops, who would
have to be quite strong because of the impossibility of quickly reinforcing
them. This operation could only be considered if it were to be conducted
as a comprehensive and converging attack on Tehran and Enzeli from
within Iran. In the aftermath of the seizure of Baku, the actions to be
taken and their degrees of importance have been described above. With
a telegram on 16 September, the Main HQS ordered that a mechanized
infrantry regiment with cannon cleanse the northern Caucasus up to the
Terek River; that a detachment immediately move down the Caspian Sea
coast to occupy Enzeli, and that a division remain in the vicinity of Baku.
The Armies of the East Group Command wrote to the Main Command
personally that the 15th Division should be sent to Reşte via the Lenkoran
-Erdbil road; that an infantry regiment from the 5th Caucasus Division,
along with an artillery battery, should be sent to the northern Caucasus;
that two regiments of the 36th Division should remain in Baku; and
ordered the detachment to be sent to the northern Caucasus to prepare to
go there.
However, the situation and conditions were not conducive to the
implementation of these orders, which contained quite a bit of detail.
The Bicherekhov forces in the northern Caucasus had 5-6,000
infantrymen, about 20 cannon and about 100 machine guns. Just one
infantry regiment and a battery were insufficient to retard such an enemy
force. Additionally, the order made no mention at all of the Karabağ
matter. If Antranik were ignored the Karabağ Moslems would be
annihilated and the rail line that ran from Shusha north would be cut off.
Consequently, a Karabağ operation was essential.
Antranik was quite strong, although the Armenian government did not
officially recognize him and expelled him from the army cadre. Never-
theless, he never refrained from his surreptitious resistance. If three of
our existing regiments were sent to the north and two to Karabağ, two
regiments would remain, which would be sufficient for the defense of
Baku and other operations in Azerbaijan. There was no force remaining
for the Lenkoran operation. It would be impossible to launch attacks
everywhere. Launching such attacks without sufficient forces and
provisions would prolong the conflict and, if unsuccessful, put our
position in the Caucasus in jeopardy.
Based on these reasons and considerations, the Islam Army Command
decided to allocate the 56th and 38th Infantry Regiments, a Krupp
mountain battalion, the 15th Division and its ‘kudretli’ mountain battery,
together with some assistance classes of this Division, for the seizure of
Derbent and Petrovsk and to allocate a force consisting of the 9th and
106th Infantry Regiments, Azerbaijani cavalry companies and a Schneider
cannon battalion for an operation against Karabağ, under the command
of Colonel Cemil Cahid Bey. The ‘Dehşet’ (terror/awe) movement was
to be conducted after the resolution of the Karabağ matter.
Besides the Army HQS in Baku and surroundings, there was also the 5th
Division HQS and its 10th, 13th, 107th Infantry Regiments, a powerful
mountain battery, one field battery and one ‘öbüs’ (cannon) battery, along
with a ‘kudretli’ mountain battery of the 37th Infantry Regiment there.
However, since cannon ammunition was in short supply, it was kept for
the Baku area and provided only for the ‘kudretli’ battery of the
15th division. The 13th Regiment was to gather in Baku city, while the
10th and 107th regiments were to assemble at Bilecari. Because the
forces allocated for the Dagestan and Karabağ operations were in the
Baku area they would have to be transported by train as far as the Yehvak
station in order to go to the north and to Karabağ. Those forces heading
north would embark at Bilecari station and those destined for Karabağ
would embark at Pona station.
The Baku-Derbent railway was not in any condition to support large-
scale transport. Telegraf and telephone lines along the rail line had been
destroyed, as had been facilities at some stations. Because the Caspian
Sea was under the control of the enemy fleet there was no way to take
precautions on the rail line, which ran along the sea coast. For these
reasons, all available railway equipment was allocated for transport to
Karabağ and this transport was effected between 23-27 September and
empty trains were gathered at Bilecari on 30 September for the transport
of the 15th Division. Since the Army wanted to display both speed and
fury in the operation, it wanted the rail line transport capability to
continue
without interruption and for the first troops arriving at the gathering point
to attack within a day or two in order to prevent the enemy from
implementing countermeasures. Otherwise, the enemy would have the
chance to reinforce its troops from the rear.
While the Karabağ transport was underway, troops from the 15th Division
gathered at Bilecari and certain shortfalls were remedied. Turkish station
commanders were appointed for important stations from Bilecari to
Yalama, communication lines and tracks were repaired, Russian workers
on the rail line were provided food and the railway was brought to a
useable status. In addition, the Division sent a scout ahead to gather
information about friend and foe. Based on information received by the
Division on 29 September, it was understood that the railway was ready
to accomplish transport to the Yalama station.
The Division would begin transport based on the sequence listed below
as of 1 October: Ye65 T1, Ye56 staff officers and Ma.T.Kef, Ye56 T2,
telegraph team, Division HQS artillery Ye15 staff officers, Krupp
mountain battalion, ‘kudretli’ mountain battalion, bakers wing; 1st
heavy provisions wing; health company; Ye38 T, T2, Ye138 staff
officers, regimental machine gun company T3 (minus one company),
ammunition battalion staff officers, 2nd and 3rd heavy provisions
wings, Kef 42 cavalry, 3rd Battalion of the 56th Regiment. These were
all transported on 26 October to Ganja from Bilecari in order to collect
the weapons of Armenian villages south of Ganja. The 9th Company
of Ye38 T3 had already been stationed at Zenkelan (Zengilan) from the
outset. In this case, the Division was going to move out with 5 infantry
battalions, 25 machine guns, a cavalry company, 8 Krupp and 8 ‘kudretli’
mountain guns and 4,200 personnel, only half of whom were combatants.
In accordance with the order given by the Army, prior to the attack on
Derbent, the Division was to gather to the rear of Kartal Suyu (Kargaç
Suyu) and the first detachment sent to provide cover for the transport
would be disembarked at Haçmaz and brought forward as far as Kartal
Suyu (Kargaç Suyu).
The transport began at the appointed time. An armored train assigned
to the Division moved first and on it were a mountain artillery team,
two machine guns and an infantry team.
By midnight on the night of 2/3 October, Ye56 T1, T2, the regimental
machine gun company, the telegraph team and the Krupp mountain
battalion had reached the gathering point. Of these troops, Ye56 T1
was disembarked at Yalama and provided cover against Derbent.
Derbent, far right, lower corner, relative to the North Caucasus.
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