Enver Paşa in Istanbul on 3 October reflected
the quickening pace of peace talks with the Allies.
In fact, Enver would flee Turkey a week later and
the Mondros Armistice would be signed without
him on 30 October.
Meanwhile, probably unbeknownst to most of the
IAC/NCC troops, their continued efforts would
ultimately be in vain, as the fighting continued into
November, after the war was over.//
//Ed. Note: TNT will pause here and resume this
epic saga a few days from now.//
Halil Paşa, Commander of the East Armies Group
(Halil Paşa was Enver Paşa's uncle, although a year
younger.)
In a telegram that arrived at the Islam Army on 2 October, Halil Paşa,
at the East Armies Group Command, explained that first the 15th
Division and subsequently the 5th Division would be transported to
Batumi. Based on this order, Islam Army Commander Nuri Paşa,
who was in the Karabağ area, ordered that the 15th Division’s 38th
Regiment and a battery be transported to Haçmaz for onward
movement to Derbent, and that the 56th Regiment and the Division’s
other resources should remain where they were for the present. In
accordance with the previously established schedule, since the 56th
Regiment was transported first, the 38th Regiment was held at
Bilecari and, for this reason, the Division’s mobile hospital and
two provision wings were also sent. This being the case, the troops
transported under the command of the 15th Division Commander
for Derbent consisted of just the two-battalion Ye56, a cavalry
company, the Krupp mountain battalion, the ‘kudretli’ mountain
battalion, the health company and a provision wing.
Since seizing Derbent with such a weak force would be impossible,
the 15th Division was forced to halt its forward movement. Yet, this
operation was essential if the situation in the northern Caucasus was
to be ameliorated. Because Nuri Paşa wanted the transport to be
postponed for another period of time, upon his return from Karabağ
to Baku on the morning of 4 October he ordered that the 38th Regiment
move to Haçmaz and, without disembarking from his train, he went
straight to the 15 Division HQS at Haçmaz to discuss the attack to be
made against Derbent. According to the arrangement sketched out by
the Main HQS, the 10th Division, presently at Batumi, would return to
Istanbul first, followed by the 15th Division. So rather than have the
15th Division wait idly in Batumi, it would be possible for it to engage
in important action here. Based on an investigation that was made,
even the 10th Division did no begin transport to Istanbul. It was
sufficient that the intention was for the 15th Division troops in the
vicinity of Derbent to move from there when the transport ships
departed from Istanbul. Based on this consideration, the Islam Army
decided to continue the Derbent operation, under the condition that
the Division’s transport from Batumi would not be delayed. But
because the military situation was not made known to the Army, the
reason for the transport of these forces to Istanbul was not understood.
(Chief of Staff Enver Paşa, left, IAC Commander
Nuri Paşa (Enver's younger brother), right)
Situation
Harbiye/3 October 1918
Soon, peace talks, including Germany, will begin and in all
probability these talks will conclude quickly. In accordance
with national principles, our position in the Caucasus must
be strong and, in particular, the governments in Azerbaijan
and the northern Caucasus must be reinforced, in order to
strengthen our legal claims in these peace talks. For this
reason, if you leave the 5th Division’s transport aside for now,
after the 15th Division, the 12th Division is to be transported.
I think that, in any event, when the time comes for transport
the situation will have been completely clarified and decided
upon. Keep in touch with us and try to quickly put the local
Azerbaijani forces in order. Our forces currently in Azerbaijan
and the 5th Division will remain in Azerbaijan subsequently
to put the Azerbaijani military organization in order. Send a
large amount of arms and ammunition to Azerbaijan.
Head of the General Staff
Ferik (Division General)
Enver
To The Islam Army Command
I have included above the telegram I received from the Main
HQS (Istanbul) General Staff. I request that the transport of the
5th Division be postponed until further notice. Based on this
situation, the 9th Caucasus Regiment, which was sent to Karabağ
to chasten (the Armenians) and which I had recalled, can
continue its work. I also request that the transport of the 15th
Division commence. Yusuf İzzet Paşa, the Northern Caucasus
Commander, is about to arrive in Gimri and I will have him make
a decision about the Caucasus matter. For now, I request that a
detachment comprised of an infrantry regiment, half a team of
cavalry and two cannon be at the ready for the Northern Caucasus,
as per the message from the Main HQS.
Ali Paşa “Şikhlenski” has identified the cannon at Kars that are
useable. Additionally, a sufficient amount of ammunition and
8,000 riflles will be sent. The transport of these items is
dependent of the acquision of sufficient fuel and means of
transport. I request that the maximun effort be applied to this
matter and that as much fuel and empty trains as can be acquired
be sent to Gimri right away.
4/5 October 1918 East Armies Group Commander
Ferik (Division General)
Halil
According to these orders, it was decided that the Islam Army’s
15th Division would be transported to Batumi following the
seizure of Derbent. It was ordered that a detachment with the
name Derbent Detachment be established, comprised of Ye107,
north of Derbent, and a battalion, 42 cavalry and 2 Krupp
mountain cannon. Once the area north of Derbent is occupied
by the Ye107th’s battalion, the Division will begin transport to
Batumi.
On 4 October the 15th Division sent Ye56 T2, its batteries and
health and cavalry companies by train from Haçmaz to Yalama.
In the evening these troops assembled between the Karçağ
(Kartal) stream and Bilici. Up to this point there had been no
contact with the enemy. Based on the statements of Moslems
coming from Derbent, on 3 October 300 Russian and Armenian
infantry had come from Petrovsk to Derbent and on 4 October
a transport ship had come to Derbent.
The Division received some additional information to the effect
that the enemy had not established any defenses so, in order to
allow the enemy to gather additional forces, decided that all
forces, together with the participation of the 38th Regiment,
would attack Derbent on 6 October. The Regimental Commander
was ordered to quickly occupy Derbent on 5 October with a force
comprised of Ye56 T1 and T2, the regiment’s machine gun
company, a cavalry company and two mountain guns. The
regiment had the 1st Battalion advance along both sides of the
rail line and the 2nd Battalion and the artillerty team followed.
Battle map of Derbent, top. The Caspian Sea
shoreline is in the center of the map.
Without encountering any resistance, the regiment reached the
edge of the Derbent orchards after 8 or 9 o’clock at night. After
this point, the rail line’s three tracks started to run into Derbent
city. The people in the orchards said that the enemy had fled the
night before. And although the troops advanced to 800 meters
from the city station, there was still no sign of the enemy. Later,
some time after 0145, the enemy, who were hidden in and around
the train wagons at the station began firing, as did an armored
train that move south from the station. Our right arm was
subjected to the fire and since it was comprised of only one
infantry company and two machine guns, it halted. The
regiment, which was unaware of the situation, preferred to
proceed with caution in light of the broad expanse of Derbent
city. Nevertheless, the city was entered from the west and the
enemy was driven out of the station. In this way, the regiment
completely occupied Derbent and overnighted athe Derbent
fortress, south of the station.
Today (5 October) two battalions from Y56 fought with a
detachment made up of 800 infantrymen, 8 machine guns and
two cannons, under the command of Colonel Betran.
Losses for the 56th Regiment: one company commander
wounded, 25 soldiers dead, 28 soldiers wounded.
On the evening of 5 October, only 2T and 3T of Ye38 came to
Araplar. On the morning of 6 October, Division Commander
Süleyman İzzet Bey gave the necessary command for a joint
attack on the city with the participation of two battalions from
38 and the Division artillerymen. As the result of a
misunderstanding, since more artillerymen than had been
allocated had come the Division returned a ‘kudretli’ battery
to the command of the 5th Division at Bilecari, and a group of
mountain teams to Hacı Kaval for the ‘saliyan’ (permanent?)
detachment there. Because two cannon previously at Koba had
not yet been obtained, the Division had 4 ‘kudretli’ guns and
6 Krupp mountain guns for the battle on 6 October.
On the morning of 6 October, two battalions from the 38th
Regiment and artillerymen departed from Araplar. There were
still enemy elements at the station. Batteries were positioned
on the west side of the city and fired effectively at the enemy
elements around the station and at the armored train, which was
trying to approach. The 38th Regiment was surrounding the
city from the west and the 56th Regiment seized the station with
an attack. The city was combed for enemy elements and a
number of them were taken prisoner. By noon Derbent was
completely occupied.
The enemy fled north from the city, pursued by Ye56 on the
right and Ye38 T2 on the left. Y338 T3 remained in the city to
maintain security. The troops came under intense fire from an
enemy armored train, and fresh enemy forces that had come from
Petrovsk via the railway attacked, as well, forcing our troops to
stop their advance 3 kilometers north of the city, where they
began to reinforce their position on the rail line.
Derbent today
The enemy commander in Derbent, Colonel Bertran, did not
know that the Turkish troops had come to the Kartal stream and
only learned about the attack on Derbent on the morning of 5
October by means of the armored train that he had sent forward.
As the result of the attack by the 56th Regiment, a portion of
the enemy troops fled on the night of 5/6 October and the
reinforcement troops sent by ship and rail from Petrovsk could
not reach Derbent in time.
If the attack had been conducted on 6 October to ensure the
participation of the 38th Regiment, as originally planned, enemy
resistance would have been much greater and we would have
suffered greater losses. So thanks to the raid that was made,
losses were minimized and Derbent was occupied.
Although Bicherekhov neglected Colonel Beltran, the fact that
he made many subsequent attacks to stop us and regain the city
shows how important he thought it was.
// End Part V//
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