11 Temmuz 2018 Çarşamba

TNT History Mini-Series: Greek Commander in Turkish War Rebukes Rival (1922)/Part II

//Ed. Note: herewith Part II//

greek push toward ankara 1921 ile ilgili görsel sonucu

Constantine and the Ankara Expedition  

                It is worth noting here that during the entire meeting of the Council, the 
King did not offer even the slightest idea, simply listening throughout.  From his 
gestures and attitude it was evident that he was more inclined toward the research 
presented by the army. 

In this regard, a bit after the end of the Council, the aforementioned King’s 
discussion with the Ephesus Metropolitan can be confirmed: The King said to the 
priest, your holiness, recent events have been pleasing for the church, thanks to the 
victory or our army, but we are unsure about the consequences.  I am ready for 
your order...he said.

The Metropolitan cut off the King and said Your Majesty, as long as our army does
 not complete its duty the church would be guilty of ingratitude by complaining 
about its unfortunate boys being saved, especially now or at some other time.
And he added these words in  order to understand whether or not he had decided 
on the Ankara expedition.  So Your Majesty, have you decided on the Ankara 
expedition?  The King rose up in a huff and in a voice that sounded like thunder 
said:  I have not decided on anything!  I am not an expert in this matter; 
you can ask those outside who are competent on this subject!

 And without saying another word, the King mumbled something and began to
 walk around the room.  Later the Metropolitan said the following to me:
I don’t want to judge but what I understand is that the King did not participate at 
all in the Council and that he had no effect on those who will decide about 
advancing toward Ankara.

Discussion Among Gounaris, Theotokis and Kondylis

In order to better show not just the army’s thoughts but also the thoughts of the 
army corps commanders, who agreed with the army, let us talk about a discussion
that occurred between General Kondylis and the Prime Minister in Eskişehir a
few days after the Kütahya Council of War: The Prime Minister asked Kondylis’s 
idea regarding the Ankara expedition; in response, the General said that this 
expedition did not present any chance of success. 

Hearing this, the Prime Minister addressed the Minister of War, who was a 
discussant, and said to him:  Look, Mr. Kondylis is against this expedition, too.
At this point, the Minister of War approached Mr. Kondylis and in a loud voice 
said these words to him:  Mr. Kondylis, we will go to Ankara!...
Actually, despite the army’s objections, the expedition happened.

Who Bears Responsibility?

In light of these just-mentioned elucidations, I think I have the right to ask 
Mr. Stratigos  these things: which of us is lying? As Mr. Stratigos claimed, where 
was this official letter that was sent to Kütahya, concurrent with the Prime 
Minister’s arrival there, which explained the government’s thoughts about the 
Ankara expedition and requested the army’s ideas and research  regarding these 
thought of the government?  Mr. Stratigos, who was working behind the curtain
and, as it was later confirmed, behaved as the government’s advisor to the army,
probably knew the government’s position before these ideas and studies were 
conveyed to the army.

 Apparently, the army learned about the government’s thoughts regarding the 
Ankara expedition after it was a fait accompli; but Mr. Stratigos never read about 
the government’s ideas regarding the demobilization of some classes, which he 
talked about.  Because if he had been informed about this matter, the army would 
have had to provide an answer for this in the memorandum it provided to the 
Minister of War, or at the very least, this matter would have had to be discussed 
at the Kütahya Council of War. 

But Mr. Stratigos, shamelessly lying, is trying to confuse the issue and although 
only he can provide the answers about what happened, he has trumped up some 
charges about other matters.  Actually, how else to explain how the Prime Minister 
and Minister of War became convinced about the success of the Ankara expedition,
 despite the army’s opinion on the matter?

But Mr. Stratigos was basing his hopes on what he was personally saying and,
foremost, on possibilities that were comprised of the high confidence of the 
overly-excited troops.

I dismiss this erroneous possibility from a military point of view, because during
 my training at the Berlin Army Staff School I never had the pleasure of learning 
that such a major expedition could be based on such a weak chance of success.
What was the basis at that time of Mr. Stratigos’s ideas about the army’s enthusiasm? 
 Did he get this feeling from the 9th Division soldiers who instead of applauding
 themselves shouted “Discharge! Discharge!” during inspection when the Prime 
Minister and Minister of War arrived in Eskişehir for a medal ceremony?

But although Mr. Stratigos based his suggestion to the Prime Minister that the 
expedition would be successful on this possibility, I, who knew the morale of my 
troops much better, was opposed to this idea and was saying the opposite.

king constantine kütahya ile ilgili görsel sonucu
King Constantine decorating the victorious war flags outside Kütahya, 1921.


I now come to other evidence about Mr. Stratigos, who claimed that the report 
presented by the army was not adopted as the basis for the Kütahya Council of War. 
A lie of this magnitude cannot be; as we said above, this report was given 
to the Minister of War at the conclusion of the Council.  Mr. Stratigos claims that 
this report included ideas that recommended or deemed necessary that the enemy 
must be followed to Ankara or at least beaten into submission. 

And he arrives at the conclusion that the Ankara expedition was decided upon based
on this report.  Yet, this report was written with a view toward evaluating the idea 
of an expedition proposed to be made toward Ankara.  What portion of this report 
says that the Sakarya expedition must be undertaken?  On the contrary, information
 was provided in this report about all the possible scenarios before they happened 
and it was stated that the result of the expedition could not be certain in light of the
 existing difficulties.

However, unfortunately, this report was not taken into consideration and the 
expedition was decided upon based on the wildly optimistic viewpoint of Mr. 
Stratigos, who succeeded in convincing and satisfying the political chiefs that this
expedition would be crowned with success and that the Kemalist threat would 
be completely annihilated.
 For this reason I, who completely perceived the dishonest mistake that was 
perpetrated, accuse Mr. Stratigos  of being the godfather of this expedition and
 the sole culprit of it.   I also accuse Mr. Stratigos, with certain reasons that I want 
to make clear here, of dragging the political chiefs to his own point of view and 
of preparing the first blow agains the Asia Minor cause.    

And I ask Mr.Stratigos this: when the Prime Minister said to Mr. Pallis while 
discussing this expedition “Mr. Pallis, how is it that you judge this to be difficult 
when other officers consider this initiative to be easy?”, who were these other 
officers he was referring to?  There is no doubt that with the words “other officers”,
 the Prime Minister did not mean the officers of the army nor me.

Frothing at the mouth, Mr. Stratigos is trying to put the onus on me one way or 
the other in this regard.  But he should know that  he cannot choose his victim.
Let him continue his revenge, for reasons that I cannot comprehend, but he will 
be proven false, the truth will come out and the nation will judge the two of us. 
Mr. Stratigos can await this judgement and my hope is that he will understand the
judgement not with the character he has exhibited up to now but, rather, as it 
relates to reality.  

The General was not just found wanting with regard to his ideas about the 
Ankara expedition.  Subsequently, as well, he showed himself to be lacking 
the most basic knowledge of military matters in relation to the research presented 
to the Ministry of War and then sent to the army by the Ministry, as will be seen 

//END of PART II//

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