//Ed. Note: herewith Part II//
Constantine and the Ankara Expedition
It is worth noting here that during the entire meeting of the Council, the
King did not offer even the slightest idea, simply listening throughout. From his
gestures and attitude it was evident that he was more inclined toward the research
presented by the army.
In this regard, a bit after the end of the Council, the aforementioned King’s
discussion with the Ephesus Metropolitan can be confirmed: The King said to the
priest, your holiness, recent events have been pleasing for the church, thanks to the
victory or our army, but we are unsure about the consequences. I am ready for
your order...he said.
The Metropolitan cut off the King and said Your Majesty, as long as our army does
not complete its duty the church would be guilty of ingratitude by complaining
about its unfortunate boys being saved, especially now or at some other time.
And he added these words in order to understand whether or not he had decided
on the Ankara expedition. So Your Majesty, have you decided on the Ankara
expedition? The King rose up in a huff and in a voice that sounded like thunder
said: I have not decided on anything! I am not an expert in this matter;
you can ask those outside who are competent on this subject!
And without saying another word, the King mumbled something and began to
walk around the room. Later the Metropolitan said the following to me:
I don’t want to judge but what I understand is that the King did not participate at
all in the Council and that he had no effect on those who will decide about
advancing toward Ankara.
Discussion Among Gounaris, Theotokis and Kondylis
In order to better show not just the army’s thoughts but also the thoughts of the
army corps commanders, who agreed with the army, let us talk about a discussion
that occurred between General Kondylis and the Prime Minister in Eskişehir a
few days after the Kütahya Council of War: The Prime Minister asked Kondylis’s
idea regarding the Ankara expedition; in response, the General said that this
expedition did not present any chance of success.
Hearing this, the Prime Minister addressed the Minister of War, who was a
discussant, and said to him: Look, Mr. Kondylis is against this expedition, too.
At this point, the Minister of War approached Mr. Kondylis and in a loud voice
said these words to him: Mr. Kondylis, we will go to Ankara!...
Actually, despite the army’s objections, the expedition happened.
Who Bears Responsibility?
In light of these just-mentioned elucidations, I think I have the right to ask
Mr. Stratigos these things: which of us is lying? As Mr. Stratigos claimed, where
was this official letter that was sent to Kütahya, concurrent with the Prime
Minister’s arrival there, which explained the government’s thoughts about the
Ankara expedition and requested the army’s ideas and research regarding these
thought of the government? Mr. Stratigos, who was working behind the curtain
and, as it was later confirmed, behaved as the government’s advisor to the army,
probably knew the government’s position before these ideas and studies were
conveyed to the army.
Apparently, the army learned about the government’s thoughts regarding the
Ankara expedition after it was a fait accompli; but Mr. Stratigos never read about
the government’s ideas regarding the demobilization of some classes, which he
talked about. Because if he had been informed about this matter, the army would
have had to provide an answer for this in the memorandum it provided to the
Minister of War, or at the very least, this matter would have had to be discussed
at the Kütahya Council of War.
But Mr. Stratigos, shamelessly lying, is trying to confuse the issue and although
only he can provide the answers about what happened, he has trumped up some
charges about other matters. Actually, how else to explain how the Prime Minister
and Minister of War became convinced about the success of the Ankara expedition,
despite the army’s opinion on the matter?
But Mr. Stratigos was basing his hopes on what he was personally saying and,
foremost, on possibilities that were comprised of the high confidence of the
I dismiss this erroneous possibility from a military point of view, because during
my training at the Berlin Army Staff School I never had the pleasure of learning
that such a major expedition could be based on such a weak chance of success.
What was the basis at that time of Mr. Stratigos’s ideas about the army’s enthusiasm?
Did he get this feeling from the 9th Division soldiers who instead of applauding
themselves shouted “Discharge! Discharge!” during inspection when the Prime
Minister and Minister of War arrived in Eskişehir for a medal ceremony?
But although Mr. Stratigos based his suggestion to the Prime Minister that the
expedition would be successful on this possibility, I, who knew the morale of my
troops much better, was opposed to this idea and was saying the opposite.
King Constantine decorating the victorious war flags outside Kütahya, 1921.
I now come to other evidence about Mr. Stratigos, who claimed that the report
presented by the army was not adopted as the basis for the Kütahya Council of War.
A lie of this magnitude cannot be; as we said above, this report was given
to the Minister of War at the conclusion of the Council. Mr. Stratigos claims that
this report included ideas that recommended or deemed necessary that the enemy
must be followed to Ankara or at least beaten into submission.
And he arrives at the conclusion that the Ankara expedition was decided upon based
on this report. Yet, this report was written with a view toward evaluating the idea
of an expedition proposed to be made toward Ankara. What portion of this report
says that the Sakarya expedition must be undertaken? On the contrary, information
was provided in this report about all the possible scenarios before they happened
and it was stated that the result of the expedition could not be certain in light of the
However, unfortunately, this report was not taken into consideration and the
expedition was decided upon based on the wildly optimistic viewpoint of Mr.
Stratigos, who succeeded in convincing and satisfying the political chiefs that this
expedition would be crowned with success and that the Kemalist threat would
be completely annihilated.
For this reason I, who completely perceived the dishonest mistake that was
perpetrated, accuse Mr. Stratigos of being the godfather of this expedition and
the sole culprit of it. I also accuse Mr. Stratigos, with certain reasons that I want
to make clear here, of dragging the political chiefs to his own point of view and
of preparing the first blow agains the Asia Minor cause.
And I ask Mr.Stratigos this: when the Prime Minister said to Mr. Pallis while
discussing this expedition “Mr. Pallis, how is it that you judge this to be difficult
when other officers consider this initiative to be easy?”, who were these other
officers he was referring to? There is no doubt that with the words “other officers”,
the Prime Minister did not mean the officers of the army nor me.
Frothing at the mouth, Mr. Stratigos is trying to put the onus on me one way or
the other in this regard. But he should know that he cannot choose his victim.
Let him continue his revenge, for reasons that I cannot comprehend, but he will
be proven false, the truth will come out and the nation will judge the two of us.
Mr. Stratigos can await this judgement and my hope is that he will understand the
judgement not with the character he has exhibited up to now but, rather, as it
relates to reality.
The General was not just found wanting with regard to his ideas about the
Ankara expedition. Subsequently, as well, he showed himself to be lacking
the most basic knowledge of military matters in relation to the research presented
to the Ministry of War and then sent to the army by the Ministry, as will be seen
//END of PART II//