in castigating Gen. Stratigos for his alleged misrepresentations
and slanders, with regard to the Battle of Sakarya (August,
1921), in particular.//
General Anastasios Papoulas
Addendum (A)
In an article published in “Politika” newspaper, “Mr. Stratigos” claims that
General Papoulas has confused events with the event dates and occurrences, and
that, at the same time, some of the former Chief Commander’s telegrams reflect
his own ill intentions.
“General Papoulas” answers these accusations with the following letter:
“General Stratigos” is trying to convince me in quite a naive way about my
mixing up issues and my not remembering events. But it would have been preferable
for him to show us which of these telegrams he is talking about; in this way we
would have found out that we were being deceived. “Mr. Stratigos” wanted to
convince us with mere words. The aforementioned individual is asking us whether
or not we proposed the “Sakarya” expedition, just as others, by examining the
army’s report, have wanted to convince us in regard to our having recommended
the “Sakarya” expedition.
However, if the people who rely on this report had carefully examined and
researched the matters I presented to the public in my first article, they would have
noticed the following points that do not supprt their case:
“This report was written upon the specific order given to me by the Minister
of War for advancing to Ankara, and, accordingly, it was predicated on the basis of
the necessity for us to initiate this expedition. Certainly,for this reason in the first
portion of the report, based on a question the army was subjected to on this issue,
the statement is made to the effect that we must pursue the enemy, etcetera. In this
way, it shows that the operation was mandatory not according to the army’s own
ideas and opinions, but because the operation had to be undertaken in accordance
with the order given to the army to conduct the expedition.
However, further on in the report the army points out the difficulties
confronting the success of the initiative and that if, in the course of the operation,
these difficulties manifest themselves, then the army would make a decision as
the result of having to return to the departure lines (lines of initial movement).
As we have said previously, though, the report was not considered and the
expedition happened.
As I conclude my letter, without holding responsible those agents who have
insulted me personally with their attacks, I assert that I will continue every
argument based on documents and official records. Let me add that I challenge
anyone who wants to confront me on this issue.
Addendum (B)
In response to Mr. Papoulas’s accusations that Mr. Stratigos was actually the
author of the orders that the Minister of War wrote from Bursa, telling the army to
stay on the east bank of the Sakarya and fortify its positions, Mr. Stratigos claims
that he was not in “Bursa” on 4 September 1921. Additionally, the aforementioned
individual is sending the following copy of a letter, which was sent to himself by
the Prime Minister via radio telegram, and which, rather than showing that at that
time there was a rift between General Dosmanis and “Mr. Theotokis”, on the
contrary, exposes that the aforementioned individual suggested to the Prime
Minister the ideas and plans that “Mr. Papoulas” has attributed to “Mr. Stratigos”:
Bursa
1 – 9 – 21
To the Prime Minister at the Ministry of War in Athens
Number De-ciphered telegram
15743
As I send the following report of the Chief of the General Staff, I am also
transmitting the ideas and judgments of the competent authorities, whose opinions
I personally share. The government may provide to the army the instructions
contained in the following report, without violating the policy the government has
thus far followed of not interfering in matters which are strictly military.
Mr. Prime Minister,
I see that the army, in the latest phase of the evolution of its thinking and
decisions, personally intends to continue its retreat to “Eskişehir”. Without
hesitation, I submit my opinion that the army’s retreat march from the definite
line on the east side of the Sakarya has put the government and the army in a very
difficult position and I request that at this time, at least, I be listened to and obeyed.
It is an essential and immediate requirement that this retreat movement toward the
rear be stopped until a buffer zone is established to separate the warring armies, in
the course of any political initiatives to be undertaken in the future.
Again, without hesitation, I submit by belief that our army staying near the
west bank of the Sakarya will not eliminate the consequences resulting from the
stoppage of our forward movement toward the northeast, but it will modify these
consequences.
I request that you stop the full army’s movement toward “Eskişehir” in order
to assure and support the morale of half the army and to enable the government to
engage in political negotiations.
The only reason I am involving myself in the discussion about this matter is
that our military position, and our invasive and aggressive posture, have an effect
on public opinion. For this reason I take this initiative, which inspires in me a pure
and clean feeling of patriotism.
In the event that you approve my ideas on this subject and have the army
accept it as the decision of the government, I will provide detailed information and
explanations about the matter and the situation as I deem appropriate.
Dosmanis, Theotokis Secret registry number 15061
Transmitted on 2 – 9 – 21
Georgios Theotokis, Greek Minister of War
In response to this, “General Papoulas” declares that order number 15802,
not telegram number 15790, is attributable to Mr. Stratigos and that Mr. Stratigos
did not just write the aforementioned order, he even brought it himself to
“Eskişehir”.
As evidence of this “Mr. Papoulas mentions Ministry of War telegram number
15842 of 8 – 9 -21, in which there is the following sentence:
“I think that you received order number 15802, which was sent to you via
“General Stratigos” so that you would receive it more quickly...”
In addition to this, General “Dosmanis” talks about the army being left at a
position not far from the west bank of the Sakarya.
The aforementioned individual does not mention extending and lengthening the
front to the Black Sea and Antalya, nor does he talk about the promotion of certain
classes after the implementation of the lengthening issue.
The other possibility is that Mr. Dosmanis fell victim to the ideas of
Mr. Stratigos, who at that time was telling everyone about his projects related to
lengthening our lines.
When it comes to General Statigos’s claim that he mentioned in “Politika”
newspaper on 4 October, about the existence of a telegram whose publication would
rattle General Papoulas, “Mr. Papoulas” submits that such a telegram could never
be published since it exists only in the imagination of Mr. Stratigos.
General Xenophon Stratigos
//END OF PART X - FINAL//
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