between himself and his superiors, with regard to preparations
for what came to be known as the Second Battle of İnönü in
March 1921, emphasizing his urgent need for troops.//
1921 – March Operation
We have no intention of accusing anyone. At that time, the government’s hasty
decision to attack, before the “army” had been reinforced sufficiently, probably
stemmed from certain important reasons. After reading the continuation of this
explanation, there can be no doubt that the “army” completely understood the serious
consequences of embarking on the operation before the reinforcing detachments had
been sent.
In January, 1921, the “Minister of War” conveyed to me a secret telegram that
had arrived from Prime Minister Kalogeropoulos, who was in “London” at that time.
In it, the question was asked whether or not I would be conducting an attack to occupy
the (Eskişehir – Afyonkarahisar) line. After consulting with the “General Staff”, I
responded by saying that I could mount such an attack after the weather cleared but
with one condition – that I be reinforced with 5,000 soldiers and various sorts of
ammunition.
The “Minister of War” said in response that the provision of ammunition was
possible but that sending reinforcement soldiers would be impossible. In order to
explain the gravity of the anticipated initiative to the government, I immediately sent
my General Staff officer “Major Venardos” to “Athens”. “Mr. Venardos” explained
to the Minister of War that the army had an absolute reinforcement need for officers
and at least 5,000 soldiers.
The “Minister of War” became convinced that the attack initiative would be
absolutely impossible without the provision of the requested reinforcements, so he
gave “Mr. Venardos” permission to send me a telegram stating that the reinforcement
detachments would be sent. At the same time, I received a telegram from the Minister
in which he said that an “extra” regiment of 2,500 soldiers, then in “Athens”, would
be sent. With the receipt of these assurances, I sent the following telegram to the
Minister of War.
To the Minister of War in Athens
Based on the reinforcements and your promises, I am leaving for “Bursa” to prepare
the operation.
Papoulas
At the same time, I sent the following telegram with the request for the complete
supplementary force.
Commander of the Army of Asia Minor İzmir
General Staff Office 1 25 – 2 – 21
Number cipher
2323
To the Minister of War
(Office of the General Staff)
Based on your cipher order number 1528, I request accelerated dispatch of the
remaining soldiers. I leave for “Bursa” on Monday.
Commander of the Army of Asia Minor
Papoulas
(I provided all the above telegrams to the interrogation committee during
the trial of the Ministers.)
Five days later, on 1 March, I left for Bursa with “Mr. Venardos”, because
“Mr. Pallis” was ill and Colonel “Sarıyanis” was in London.
Upon arriving in Bursa on the third of the month, I ordered the 3rd Army Corps
to make the necessary preparations for the attack and, at the same time, I informed the
1st Army Corps of the matter.
Meanwhile, although no reinforcing detachments had yet arrived, I received a
telegram from the Minister of War on 6 March, in which he quoted a telegram he had
received from the Prime Minister in London declaring that the attack initiative must
start immediately and that the government was taking three classes under arms.
I answered this with the telegram below:
Command of the Army of Asia Minor Bursa, Central HQS
General Staff Office 3 7 March 1921
To the Minister of War in Athens
I have the honor to inform you that, based on the Ministry’s order number 4314,
I have ordered the operation to begin on 10 March.
I request that the extra regiment that I asked to be sent urgently the day I left for
Bursa be sent to Mudanya immediately.
Army Commander
Papoulas
Sent to the Chief of the Military Delegation at Istanbul
Identical to the original. Office 3
F. Rangavis
At the same time, I sent the following telegram to “Mr. Pallis”, my Chief of
the General Staff:
Command of the Army of Asia Minor Bursa
General Staff Office 3 7 March 1921
Number
3-1441
To Colonel Pallis, Chief of the General Staff in İzmir
Cipher
The Minister of War conveyed a telegram that had arrived from London regarding
the imperative for the operation to begin immediately and informing me that a decree
had been issued for the call-up of three classes to be taken under arms. I ordered that the
operation begin on Wednesday, 10 March. I hope that your health will allow you to
return here on time. The destroyer “Niki” will be at your disposal at Bandırma as of
3 o’clock in the morning.
Commander of the Army of Asia Minor Identical to the original. Office 3
Papoulas F. Rangavis
Forced to begin the operation in this manner and taking into account the need for
the reinforcing detachments, the army began to send telegrams to the Ministry of War
in this regard. Thusly, the following telegram was sent on 6 March:
Command of the Army of Asia Minor Bursa
General Staff Office 3 6 – 3 – 21
Number
2380
To the Ministry of War in Athens
Cipher
Very Urgent
Besides the reinforcement detachments comprised of three classes, which in any
event have been mobilized to be sent to us, together with the receipt of this telegram
and as I have said previously, there is an urgent need for the extra regiment in Athens
and for the existing separate reinforcement detachments within the country to be sent
to us. I request that I be informed of the dispatch of the aforementioned forces to
Mudanya by telegram.
Army Commander
Papoulas
İnönü district of Eskişehir province today.
At the same time, the following telegram was sent to the Military Delegation in
Istanbul:
Command of the Army of Asia Minor
General Staff Office 1
Secret registry number 1508-4602
To the Military Delegation in Istanbul
The referenced reserve soldiers should be sent to Mudanya at the first opportunity
so that they can be put to use in Bursa.
Commander of the Army of Asia Minor
Papoulas
Manner of transmission: based on Ministry of War order number 1924, to the
aforementioned Ministry in report form, and to the Bursa Military Government.
In response to these repeated requests, the Ministry of War answered with
assurance that the reinforcements would be sent. However, by 7 March no
reinforcements at all had come.
The army, hoping that the extra regiment was en route and that the Ministry
would accelerate transport of the other reinforcement detachments, sent the
following report about the transport of the mobilized 3 classes.
Command of the Army of Asia Minor From the southeast of Hill 940-elevation
General Staff Office 1 8 March – 1921
Number
4052
To the Ministry of War in Athens
Very urgent To the Army General Staff Office
I have the honor to request that the matter of personnel reinforcement of the
army under my command, relying on the mobilized three classes of reserves and
absentee conscripts and fugitives who have been put into service, be implemented
with the goal of filling the vacancies resulting from the the discrepancy between
the envisioned forces and the exsiting ones.
In the event that my proposal is accepted, this would require that the following
forces be sent to the disembarkation points shown below:
1. To Izmir infantry 19,000
artillery 4,000
engineers 2,500
cavalry 250
2. To Sakız infantry 15,000
artillery 2,000
engineers 1,500
cavalry 500
3. To Izmit infantry 3,100
artillery 250
engineers 350
cavalry --
4. To Bandırma infantry 1,800
If it is not possible to reinforce the army in the manner shown above, then in
order to close the gap between the envisioned forces and the assigned forces, I deem
it absolutely necessary that the forces listed below be sent come what may.
1. To Izmir infantry 15,000
artillery 5,400
engineers 2,000
cavalry 150
2. To Sakız infantry 11,000
artillery 1,200
engineers 1,100
cavalry 400
3. To Izmit infantry 2,500
artillery 200
engineers 300
4. To Bandırma infantry 1,700
In either case, upon the repeated requests of the British, I found that I had to send
200 soldiers to Istanbul to reinforce the independent battalion in Istanbul.
Let me not forget to add here that the reinforcements requested above were
calculated on the basis of the existing organization below, as you informed Colonel
Venardos.
Also, another item to be taken note of is, in either case, the junior grade officers,
who have been given the name “rear regiments” in the force calculations, and who
will be assigned to provide cover for the occupied land, should be sent in the
proportions given below:
1. To Izmir infantry officers 276
cavalry officers 10
2. To Sakız infantry officers 272
cavalry officers 7
3. To Izmit infantry officers 31
4. To Bandırma infantry officers 14
All of the officers should be sent in accordance with the intention of our previous
report submitted via Colonel Venardos, as follows:
In addition to the military commanders for the various classes belonging to the
various detachments and the above listed infantry and calvary officers, the junior grade
officers will be sent to Izmir.
In the event that these officers are not sent together with the soldiers or equipment,
they should be sent in the following arrangement and order:
1. Via Sakız, 2. Via Izmir, 3. Via Izmit, 4. Via Bandırma, 5. Via Istanbul.
In closing, I request a response as to which of the two alternatives shown above
will be accepted and approved.
With regard to the army’s animals, I will write my thoughts soon about the
method of transport for animal replenishment:
In the event that there are animals ready for shipment, I request that half of these
be sent to Izmir and and half to Sakız.
Army Commander
Papoulas
Manner of transmission: identical to the original
Office 4 Office 1 Director
Quartermaster Office Colonel
Central Command Echelon Galiatastos
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